The Law of Refugee Status
Höfundar:
James C. Hathaway; Michelle Foster (Útgáfa: 2)
Kaup valmöguleikar
The first edition of The Law of Refugee Status (published in 1991) is generally regarded as the seminal text on interpreting the refugee definition set by the UN's 1951 Refugee Convention. Its groundbreaking analysis served as the bedrock for not only much judicial reasoning, but also for a burgeoning academic literature in law and related fields. This second edition builds on the strong critical focus and human rights orientation of the first edition, but undertakes an entirely original analysis of the jurisprudence of leading common law and select civil law states.
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- Cambridge University Press
- 9781139985000
- 9781107012516
- ePub
- 2
- James C. Hathaway; Michelle Foster
- English
- 2014-07-10
- 10
- 5
- 5
Kaflar
- Coverpage
- Half title page
- Title page
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Table of cases
- Table of treaties and other international instruments
- Abbreviations for courts and tribunals cited
- Introduction
- 1 Alienage
- 1.1 Accessing protection
- 1.1.1 Accessing a state party’s jurisdiction
- 1.1.2 Unlawful arrival
- 1.2 Choice of the country of asylum
- 1.2.1 The legal basis for allocating protective responsibility
- 1.2.2 The duty to avoid refoulement
- 1.2.3 The duty to ensure respect for acquired rights
- 1.3 Determining the state of reference
- 1.3.1 Dual or multiple nationality
- 1.3.2 Inchoate nationality
- 1.3.3 Stateless persons
- 1.4 Refugees sur place
- 2 Well-founded fear
- 2.1 Implications of the traditional bipartite standard
- 2.2 Practical challenges of implementing the bipartite standard
- 2.2.1 The risky objectification of subjective fear
- 2.2.2 The equation of subjective fear with credibility
- 2.2.3 The creation of unwieldy exceptions
- 2.2.4 Assuming subjective fear
- 2.3 Fear understood as objective apprehension of risk
- 2.3.1 The literal meaning of “well-founded fear”
- 2.3.2 The object and purpose of “well-founded fear”
- 2.4 Well-founded apprehension of risk: stating the test
- 2.4.1 Risks in application of the test
- 2.4.2 Shared duty of fact-finding
- 2.4.3 Relevant evidence
- 2.5 Country of origin information
- 2.5.1 Unenforced persecutory laws
- 2.5.2 Improved respect for human rights
- 2.6 The claimant’s evidence
- 2.6.1 The assessment of credibility
- 2.6.2 Credibility implications of mode of departure, travel, or arrival
- 2.6.3 Corroboration
- 2.6.4 Procedural safeguards
- 2.7 Evidence of individuated past persecution
- 2.8 Evidence of risk to persons similarly situated
- 2.9 Assessing well-founded fear within the context of generalized risk
- 3 Serious harm
- 3.1 A bifurcated understanding of “being persecuted”
- 3.2 Identifying serious harm
- 3.2.1 The subjective approach rejected
- 3.2.2 The literalist approach rejected
- 3.2.3 Human rights as the benchmark
- 3.3 Physical security
- 3.3.1 Life
- 3.3.2 Torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
- 3.3.3 Slavery, including trafficking and forced marriage
- 3.3.4 Physical violence
- 3.3.5 Adequate standard of living
- 3.3.6 Health
- 3.4 Liberty and freedom
- 3.4.1 Arrest and detention
- 3.4.2 Prosecution
- 3.4.3 Freedom of movement
- 3.4.4 Right to work
- 3.5 Autonomy and self-realization
- 3.5.1 Religion
- 3.5.2 Conscience and belief, including resistance to military service
- 3.5.3 Education
- 3.5.4 Expression and assembly
- 3.5.5 Family and marriage
- 3.5.6 Privacy
- 4 Failure of state protection
- 4.1 Protection is state protection
- 4.2 Failure of state protection as an element of “being persecuted”
- 4.2.1 Unwillingness to protect
- 4.2.2 Inability to protect
- 4.2.3 No presumption of state protection
- 4.2.4 Relevance of failure to seek protection
- 4.2.5 Relevance of general evidence of state protection
- 4.3 Internal protection alternative
- 4.3.1 The conceptual basis of the internal protection alternative
- 4.3.2 The test for assessing internal protection
- Accessibility
- Negation of original risk
- No new risk of being persecuted or of refoulement
- Minimum affirmative state protection
- 5 Nexus to civil or political status
- 5.1 “For reasons of”
- 5.2 The nature of the causal link
- 5.2.1 Intention of the persecutor
- 5.2.2 Intention of the persecutor or of the state
- 5.2.3 The predicament approach
- 5.3 Quantifying the causal link
- 5.4 The Convention grounds
- 5.5 Race
- 5.6 Nationality
- 5.7 Religion
- 5.8 Political opinion
- 5.8.1 Unexpressed political opinion
- 5.8.2 Political opinion implicit in conduct
- 5.9 Membership of a particular social group
- 5.9.1 Gender
- 5.9.2 Sexual orientation and gender identity
- 5.9.3 Family
- 5.9.4 Age
- 5.9.5 Disability
- 5.9.6 Economic or social class
- 5.9.7 Voluntary associations
- 5.9.8 Former status or association
- 6 Persons no longer needing protection
- 6.1 Persons who have secured national protection
- 6.1.1 Voluntary re-availment of national protection
- 6.1.2 Voluntary re-acquisition of nationality
- 6.1.3 Voluntary re-establishment in the country of origin
- 6.1.4 Change of circumstances
- 6.1.5 Acquisition of a new nationality
- 6.2 Persons who benefit from alternative forms of protection
- 6.2.1 Residence with the rights and obligations of nationals
- 6.2.2 United Nations protection or assistance
- “At present receiving…protection or assistance”
- Particularized exceptions to Art. 1(D) exclusion?
- Ipso facto residual entitlement
- Relevance of UN protection or assistance to non-Palestinians
- 7 Persons not deserving protection
- 7.1 “Serious reasons for considering”
- 7.2 Serious common crimes
- 7.2.1 Justiciable crimes
- 7.2.2 Crimes committed abroad
- 7.2.3 Serious crimes
- 7.2.4 Non-political crimes
- 7.2.5 “Balancing” criminality and risk
- 7.3 International crimes
- 7.3.1 Crimes against peace
- 7.3.2 War crimes
- 7.3.3 Crimes against humanity
- 7.4 Acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations
- Index