The Economics Of Collective Choice
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The study of government policy and public decision-making has experienced a renaissance in recent years as economists and political scientists have come together to form the new field of collective, or public, choice. The Economics of Colletive Choice is a breakthrough text in this field. It is the first to approach the public policy process with a sophisticated understanding of both economics and government and to present these ideas with a grace and accessibility entirely appropriate to undergraduates.
Collective choice economics as presented by Professor Stevens is a mix of applied welfare economics and public choice analysis and does not presuppose a knowledge of intermediate microeconomics. Professor Stevens credits both the conservative insight that government intervention is often worse than what it is intended to cure and the liberal view that efficiency and justice are sometimes best served by intervention.
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- Taylor & Francis
- 9780429972485
- 9780367320317
- ePub
- 1
- Joe B Stevens
- English
- 2018-02-06
- 100
- 2
- 2
Kaflar
- Cover
- Half Title
- Title
- Copyright
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 1.0 Economics and Collective Choice
- 1.1 Elements of Collective Choice
- 1.2 Examples of Collective Choice
- 1.3 Linkages Among the Examples
- 1.4 Objectives of the Book
- 1.5 Summary
- 2 Efficiency and Equity as Reasons for Collective Action
- 2.0 The Efficiency Criterion
- 2.1 There Are Many Efficient Outputs: Is There a Best One?
- 2.2 Efficiency and Equity: Making Trade-Offs
- 2.3 Summary
- 3 Markets: Will They Be Efficient?
- 3.0 Introduction
- 3.1 Markets and Government
- 3.2 When Markets Will Be Efficient
- 3.3 When Markets Won’t Be Efficient
- 3.4 Three Examples of Market Failure
- 3.5 Summary
- 4 Markets: Will They Be Fair?
- 4.0 Introduction
- 4.1 Distributional Sources of Market Failure
- 4.2 The Distribution of Money Incomes, 1947–1990
- 4.3 Philosophic Approaches to the Question of Equity
- 4.4 Summary
- Appendix: Income and Substitution Effects
- 5 Voluntary Solutions to Market Failure
- 5.0 Introduction
- 5.1 Self-Interest and the Collective Interest
- 5.2 Joint Provision of Public Goods
- 5.3 Market Solutions to Externalities
- 5.4 Private Provision of Public Goods
- 5.5 Experiments with Public Goods
- 5.6 Clubs as Voluntary Solutions
- 5.7 Summary
- 6 Direct (Participatory) Government
- 6.0 When Some Are Made Worse Off
- 6.1 Voluntary Acceptance of Coercion
- 6.2 Voting Without Exit
- 6.3 Aggregation of Preferences by Voting
- 6.4 Expressing Intensities of Preferences
- 6.5 Summary
- 7 Legislative Government: Part 1
- 7.0 Why Have Government?
- 7.1 Representative Government in Historical Perspective
- 7.2 From the Good Fairy to the Wicked Witch: Four Supply Models
- 7.3 Anthony Downs: An Early View of Political Competition
- 7.4 The Demands by Citizens for Political Action
- 7.5 The Demands by Firms for Political Action
- 7.6 The Demands by Interest Groups for Political Action
- 7.7 The Supply of Political Action by Legislators
- 7.8 Summary
- 8 Legislative Government: Part 2
- 8.0 Bringing Supply and Demand Together
- 8.1 Legislative Regulation
- 8.2 Markets for Legislative Activities
- 8.3 Summary
- 9 Administrative Government: Part 1
- 9.0 Introduction
- 9.1 Public Administration
- 9.2 Iron Triangles and Subgovernments: A Consensus Model
- 9.3 Niskanen and Bureaucratic Government: A Conflict Model
- 9.4 The Economics of Organization
- 9.5 Principals and Agents in Government
- 9.6 Agenda Control and the Median Voter
- 9.7 Summary
- 10 Administrative Government: Part 2
- 10.1 Principals, Agents, and Decision Frameworks
- 10.2 Benefit-Cost Analysis
- 10.3 Other Frameworks
- 10.4 Summary
- 11 Federated Government
- 11.0 Introduction
- 11.1 Fiscal Federalism
- 11.2 Intergovernmental Grants
- 11.3 Emerging Knowledge
- 11.4 Summary
- Notes
- Bibliography
- About the Book and Author
- Index