Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs

Höfundur: Michael Tye (Útgáfa: 0)
Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs

Kaup valmöguleikar

A consideration of some of the most common questions about animal minds. Do birds have feelings? Can fish feel pain? Could a honeybee be anxious? For centuries, the question of whether or not animals are conscious like humans has prompted debates among philosophers and scientists. While most people gladly accept that complex mammals - such as dogs - share emotions and experiences with us, the matter of simpler creatures is much less clear.

Meanwhile, the advent of the digital age and artificial intelligence has created an added dimension to questions about non-human consciousness. In Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs, Michael Tye offers answers to some of today's most pressing questions about nonhuman consciousness. Blending the latest research about animal sensation with theories about the nature of consciousness, Tye develops a methodology for addressing the mysteries of the animal mind.

Without endorsing any specific theory on the nature of consciousness, Tye tackles issues such as the animal experience of pain and fear, and the role of brain anatomy in determining consciousness. He then turns his attention to the artificial realm, considering whether complex robots could ever be considered conscious. Tye concludes with a discussion of how, if we consider animals conscious, this might impact our ethical obligations to them.

Nánar um bókina

Útgefandi
Oxford University Press Academic US
ISBN
9780190278038
Print ISBN
9780190278014
Format
ePub
Útgáfa
0
Höfundar
Michael Tye
Tungumál
English
Útgefið
2016-11-01
Prent takmörkun á líftíma
100

Kaflar

  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • 1. Experience and Its Limits: The Problem
  • 2. Experience and Consciousness
  • 2.1. Problem Cases?
  • 2.2. The Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness
  • 2.3. Phenomenal Consciousness versus Access Consciousness
  • 2.4. Self-Consciousness
  • 2.5. The Upshot for Animal Consciousness
  • 3. It’s Got to Be Human!
  • 3.1. Descartes and the Animals
  • 3.2. Descartes and Turing
  • 3.3. Conceptualism about Experience
  • 4. Our Friends and Neighbors
  • 4.1. Beliefs and Desires
  • 4.2. Experiences and Feelings
  • 5. Reasoning about Other Species
  • 5.1. Cupcake’s Pain
  • 5.2. Sharpening the Issue
  • 5.3. Is the Absence of a Neocortex a Defeater?
  • 5.4. Should We Be Agnostic?
  • 5.5. Alternative Strategies
  • 6. A Fish Called Wanda
  • 6.1. Pain
  • 6.2. Fish Nociception and Fish Behavior
  • 6.3. Is There a Better Explanation?
  • 6.4. Fish Fear
  • 6.5. Perceptual Consciousness in Fish
  • 6.6. Yes, but Are There Really Fish Qualia?
  • 7. Of Birds and Reptiles (and Fish)
  • 7.1. The Origins of Birds
  • 7.2. Bird Emotions
  • 7.3. Birds and Pain
  • 7.4. Perceptual Experiences in Birds
  • 7.5. Reptiles
  • 8. Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs
  • 8.1. Insect Nociception and Pain
  • 8.2. Insects and Emotions
  • 8.3. Are Bees Zombies?
  • 8.4. Crabs and Pain
  • 8.5. Crabs and Bees
  • 9. The Girl Who Can’t Feel Pain
  • 9.1. A Complaint from Block
  • 9.2. Protozoa
  • 9.3. Plants
  • 9.4. Caterpillars
  • 10. Commander Data and Robot Rabbit
  • 10.1. The Original China-Body Problem
  • 10.2. Reasoning about Commander Data
  • 10.3. The Silicon Chip Argument
  • 10.4. Real Rabbit and Robot Rabbit
  • 10.5. A Further Reason for Preferring the View that Commander Data and Robot Rabbit Are Conscious
  • 10.6. A Final Consideration
  • 11. The Ethical Treatment of Animals
  • 11.1. Animal Welfarism
  • 11.2. Speciesism
  • 11.3. Regan and Rawls
  • 11.4. Centered Speciesism and Biological Proximity
  • 11.5. The Treatment of Animals
  • References
  • Index