Talking About
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Combining new insights from cognitive science and speech act theory, Unnsteinsson develops a compelling theory of singular reference which avoids well-known puzzles and objections. The theory, called Edenic intentionalism, is grounded in a mechanistic perspective on explanation in cognitive science and a new Gricean account of speaker meaning and speaker reference. Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference develops an account of the mental state of identity confusion and separates questions about the nature of representational acts and representational states.
Unnsteinsson proposes a division of labour, but Edenic intentionalism is strictly a theory of intentional, mind-directed representational acts, taking speech acts as its paradigm case. Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference argues that mental mechanisms ought to be postulated to explain human cognitive capacities. Pragmatic competence is the capacity to successfully produce utterances with a communicative intention.
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- Oxford University Press Academic UK
- 9780192688644
- 9780192688637
- ePub
- 0
- Elmar Unnsteinsson
- English
- 2022-06-16
- 100
- 2
- 2
Kaflar
- Cover page
- Halftitle page
- Title page
- Copyright page
- Dedication page
- Contents
- Preface
- Epigraph
- Introduction
- Confusion and Propositional Attitudes
- Mental Mechanisms and the Act of Referring
- Edenic Intentionalism
- 1. Attitude Ascriptions and Frege’s Curse
- 1.1 A Puzzle about Identity
- 1.2 Dissolving Frege
- 1.3 Attitude Ascriptions
- 1.4 Questioning Attitudes
- 1.5 Conclusion
- 2. The State of Confusion
- 2.1 Two Models of Confusion
- 2.2 Unavailable Representations
- 2.3 The Belief Model
- 2.4 Descriptive and Explanatory Adequacy
- 2.5 Conclusion
- 3. Representational Acts and Implicit Attitudes
- 3.1 Representational States and Acts
- 3.2 The Contribution of Action
- 3.3 Profoundly Implicit Beliefs
- 3.4 Conclusion
- 4. Intention or Easy Meanings?
- 4.1 A Preface to a Theory
- 4.2 The Expressionist Challenge
- 4.3 Intending to Express a Thought
- 4.4 The Expressionist Collapse
- 4.5 Conclusion
- 5. Explanation, Mechanism, and Function
- 5.1 Explanation and Mechanism
- 5.2 The Explanatory Value of Functions
- 5.3 Decomposing Referential Competence
- 5.4 Conclusion
- 6. Referential Competence
- 6.1 Speaker Meaning
- 6.2 Speaker Reference
- 6.3 Conclusion
- 7. Edenic Intentionalism
- 7.1 Objections to Intentionalism
- 7.2 The Edenic Constraint on Reference
- 7.3 Confusion Is Corruptive
- 7.4 Normal Proper Names
- 7.5 Conclusion
- 8. Good Cases, Bad Cases
- 8.1 The Belief that Elms Are Beeches
- 8.2 Two Case Studies
- 8.3 Donnellan and Kripke on Descriptions
- 8.4 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- Permissions Acknowledgments