Talking About

Höfundur: Elmar Unnsteinsson (Útgáfa: 0)
Talking About

Kaup valmöguleikar

Combining new insights from cognitive science and speech act theory, Unnsteinsson develops a compelling theory of singular reference which avoids well-known puzzles and objections. The theory, called Edenic intentionalism, is grounded in a mechanistic perspective on explanation in cognitive science and a new Gricean account of speaker meaning and speaker reference. Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference develops an account of the mental state of identity confusion and separates questions about the nature of representational acts and representational states.

Unnsteinsson proposes a division of labour, but Edenic intentionalism is strictly a theory of intentional, mind-directed representational acts, taking speech acts as its paradigm case. Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference argues that mental mechanisms ought to be postulated to explain human cognitive capacities. Pragmatic competence is the capacity to successfully produce utterances with a communicative intention.

Nánar um bókina

Útgefandi
Oxford University Press Academic UK
ISBN
9780192688644
Print ISBN
9780192688637
Format
ePub
Útgáfa
0
Höfundar
Elmar Unnsteinsson
Tungumál
English
Útgefið
2022-06-16
Prent takmörkun á líftíma
100
Prent takmörkun
2
Afritunar takmörkun
2

Kaflar

  • Cover page
  • Halftitle page
  • Title page
  • Copyright page
  • Dedication page
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Epigraph
  • Introduction
  • Confusion and Propositional Attitudes
  • Mental Mechanisms and the Act of Referring
  • Edenic Intentionalism
  • 1. Attitude Ascriptions and Frege‚Äôs Curse
  • 1.1 A Puzzle about Identity
  • 1.2 Dissolving Frege
  • 1.3 Attitude Ascriptions
  • 1.4 Questioning Attitudes
  • 1.5 Conclusion
  • 2. The State of Confusion
  • 2.1 Two Models of Confusion
  • 2.2 Unavailable Representations
  • 2.3 The Belief Model
  • 2.4 Descriptive and Explanatory Adequacy
  • 2.5 Conclusion
  • 3. Representational Acts and Implicit Attitudes
  • 3.1 Representational States and Acts
  • 3.2 The Contribution of Action
  • 3.3 Profoundly Implicit Beliefs
  • 3.4 Conclusion
  • 4. Intention or Easy Meanings?
  • 4.1 A Preface to a Theory
  • 4.2 The Expressionist Challenge
  • 4.3 Intending to Express a Thought
  • 4.4 The Expressionist Collapse
  • 4.5 Conclusion
  • 5. Explanation, Mechanism, and Function
  • 5.1 Explanation and Mechanism
  • 5.2 The Explanatory Value of Functions
  • 5.3 Decomposing Referential Competence
  • 5.4 Conclusion
  • 6. Referential Competence
  • 6.1 Speaker Meaning
  • 6.2 Speaker Reference
  • 6.3 Conclusion
  • 7. Edenic Intentionalism
  • 7.1 Objections to Intentionalism
  • 7.2 The Edenic Constraint on Reference
  • 7.3 Confusion Is Corruptive
  • 7.4 Normal Proper Names
  • 7.5 Conclusion
  • 8. Good Cases, Bad Cases
  • 8.1 The Belief that Elms Are Beeches
  • 8.2 Two Case Studies
  • 8.3 Donnellan and Kripke on Descriptions
  • 8.4 Conclusion
  • Bibliography
  • Index
  • Permissions Acknowledgments