Talking About

Höfundur: Elmar Unnsteinsson (Útgáfa: 0)
Talking About

Kaup valmöguleikar

Combining new insights from cognitive science and speech act theory, Unnsteinsson develops a compelling theory of singular reference which avoids well-known puzzles and objections. The theory, called Edenic intentionalism, is grounded in a mechanistic perspective on explanation in cognitive science and a new Gricean account of speaker meaning and speaker reference. Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference develops an account of the mental state of identity confusion and separates questions about the nature of representational acts and representational states.

Unnsteinsson proposes a division of labour, but Edenic intentionalism is strictly a theory of intentional, mind-directed representational acts, taking speech acts as its paradigm case. Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference argues that mental mechanisms ought to be postulated to explain human cognitive capacities. Pragmatic competence is the capacity to successfully produce utterances with a communicative intention.

By examining the characteristic function and malfunction of the mechanism for referential competence, the study shows that confused reference should be understood as a type of malfunction. This is the core thesis of Edenic intentionalism: that the identity confusion disrupts the normal function of the speech act of reference.

Nánar um bókina

Útgefandi
Oxford University Press Academic UK
ISBN
9780192688644
Print ISBN
9780192865137
Format
ePub
Útgáfa
0
Höfundar
Elmar Unnsteinsson
Tungumál
English
Útgefið
2022-06-16
Prent takmörkun á líftíma
100
Prent takmörkun
2
Afritunar takmörkun
2

Kaflar

  • Cover page
  • Halftitle page
  • Title page
  • Copyright page
  • Dedication page
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Epigraph
  • Introduction
  • Confusion and Propositional Attitudes
  • Mental Mechanisms and the Act of Referring
  • Edenic Intentionalism
  • 1. Attitude Ascriptions and Frege‚Äôs Curse
  • 1.1 A Puzzle about Identity
  • 1.2 Dissolving Frege
  • 1.3 Attitude Ascriptions
  • 1.4 Questioning Attitudes
  • 1.5 Conclusion
  • 2. The State of Confusion
  • 2.1 Two Models of Confusion
  • 2.2 Unavailable Representations
  • 2.3 The Belief Model
  • 2.4 Descriptive and Explanatory Adequacy
  • 2.5 Conclusion
  • 3. Representational Acts and Implicit Attitudes
  • 3.1 Representational States and Acts
  • 3.2 The Contribution of Action
  • 3.3 Profoundly Implicit Beliefs
  • 3.4 Conclusion
  • 4. Intention or Easy Meanings?
  • 4.1 A Preface to a Theory
  • 4.2 The Expressionist Challenge
  • 4.3 Intending to Express a Thought
  • 4.4 The Expressionist Collapse
  • 4.5 Conclusion
  • 5. Explanation, Mechanism, and Function
  • 5.1 Explanation and Mechanism
  • 5.2 The Explanatory Value of Functions
  • 5.3 Decomposing Referential Competence
  • 5.4 Conclusion
  • 6. Referential Competence
  • 6.1 Speaker Meaning
  • 6.2 Speaker Reference
  • 6.3 Conclusion
  • 7. Edenic Intentionalism
  • 7.1 Objections to Intentionalism
  • 7.2 The Edenic Constraint on Reference
  • 7.3 Confusion Is Corruptive
  • 7.4 Normal Proper Names
  • 7.5 Conclusion
  • 8. Good Cases, Bad Cases
  • 8.1 The Belief that Elms Are Beeches
  • 8.2 Two Case Studies
  • 8.3 Donnellan and Kripke on Descriptions
  • 8.4 Conclusion
  • Bibliography
  • Index
  • Permissions Acknowledgments