Rational Choice

Höfundar: Andrew Hindmoor; Brad Taylor (Útgáfa: 2)
Rational Choice

Kaup valmöguleikar

Assuming no prior knowledge, this widely-used and critically-acclaimed text provides a clear introduction to, and uniquely fair-minded assessment of, Rational Choice approaches. The substantially revised, updated and extended new edition includes more substantial coverage of game theory, collective action, 'revisionist' public choice, and the use of rational choice in International Relations.

Nánar um bókina

Útgefandi
Bloomsbury UK
ISBN
9781137427441
Print ISBN
9781137427410
Format
Page Fidelity (PDF)
Útgáfa
2
Höfundar
Andrew Hindmoor; Brad Taylor
Tungumál
English
Útgefið
2017-09-16
Prent takmörkun á líftíma
100
Prent takmörkun
2
Afritunar takmörkun
2

Kaflar

  • Contents
  • List of Boxes, Figuresand Tables
  • Preface
  • Chapter 1 Introduction
  • Political economy to economics
  • The emergence of rational choice ( 1950– 1970)
  • The take- off to growth ( 1970– 1994)
  • A difficult decade ( 1994– 2004)
  • Major combat operations are over? ( 2004–)
  • Chapter 2 James M. Buchanan and ConstitutionalPolitical Economy
  • Setting the stage: the state as an escapefrom Hobbesian anarchy
  • Exchange and the constitutional framework
  • Choice within rules versus choice among rules
  • The Calculus of Consent
  • Covenants without the sword
  • Assessment
  • Chapter 3 Anthony Downs and the Spatial Theory of Party Competition
  • Setting the stage: the demands of democracy
  • The precursors of party competition
  • The median voter theorem
  • Qualifying the argument: accounting for divergence
  • Assumption 1: there are only two parties
  • Assumption 2: political space is one- dimensional
  • Assumption 3: parties can move to and occupyany point in this one- dimensional space
  • Assumption 4: parties are vote- maximizers
  • Assumption 5: voters vote for the party closestto them in political space
  • Assumption 6: there is perfect information
  • Assumption 7: voters’ preferences are fixed
  • Assessment
  • Chapter 4 William Riker and the Theoryof Coalitions
  • Setting the stage: choosing a voting system
  • Riker and the theory of the minimal- winningcoalition
  • Policy- seeking parties
  • The portfolio- allocation model
  • The transaction costs of policy agreements
  • Assessment
  • Chapter 5 Kenneth Arrow and Social Choice Theory
  • Setting the stage: democracy and the public will
  • The precursors of social choice theory
  • Arrow: social choice and individual values
  • Riker: liberalism against populism
  • The possibility of social choice
  • Assessment
  • Chapter 6 Mancur Olson and the Logic of Collective Action
  • Setting the stage: individuals, groups and rationality
  • Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action
  • Resolving collective action problems
  • Elinor Ostrom and common pool governance
  • Assessment
  • Chapter 7 Gordon Tullock, Rent- Seeking and Government Failure
  • Setting the stage: government without angels
  • Rent- seeking: the welfare costs of tariffs,monopolies and theft
  • Corruption, slack and bureaucracy
  • Political agency, constraint and selection
  • Assessment
  • Chapter 8 Anthony Downs (again) and The Economics of Information and Voter Choice
  • Setting the stage: motivation, information and rational choice
  • Rational ignorance
  • Low- information rationality
  • Rational irrationality
  • Expressive voting
  • Assessment
  • Chapter 9 Rational Choice Explanation
  • Introduction
  • Positivism and explanation through laws
  • All other things being equal: tendency laws and the inexact (social) sciences
  • Scientific realism and the search for mechanisms
  • The place of rational choice theory in political science
  • Bibliography
  • Index