Metaphysics

Höfundur: Alyssa Ney (Útgáfa: 2)
Metaphysics

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Metaphysics: An Introduction, Second Edition combines comprehensive coverage of the core elements of metaphysics with contemporary and lively debates within the subject. It provides a rigorous and yet accessible overview of a rich array of topics, connecting the abstract nature of metaphysics with the real world. Topics covered include: basic logic for metaphysics an introduction to ontology abstract objects material objects critiques of metaphysics natural and social kinds the metaphysics of race and gender grounding and fundamentality free will time modality persistence causation.

This outstanding book not only equips the reader with a thorough knowledge of the fundamentals of metaphysics, but provides a valuable guide to contemporary metaphysics and metaphysicians. New for this second edition are updated sections on metaphysical indeterminacy; new sections on manipulation arguments and free will and neuroscience; and new chapters on the important topics of social ontology, fundamentality, and grounding.

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Útgefandi
Taylor & Francis
ISBN
9781351141185
Print ISBN
9780815350484
Format
ePub
Útgáfa
2
Höfundar
Alyssa Ney
Tungumál
English
Útgefið
2023-04-18
Prent takmörkun á líftíma
100
Prent takmörkun
2
Afritunar takmörkun
2

Kaflar

  • Cover
  • Half Title
  • Endorsements
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Notes on the Second Edition
  • Acknowledgments
  • Visual Tour of Metaphysics: An Introduction
  • Preparatory Background: Logic for Metaphysics
  • 0.1 Arguments
  • 0.2 Validity
  • 0.3 Soundness
  • 0.4 Criticizing Arguments
  • 0.5 The Principle of Charity and Enthymemes
  • 0.6 Propositional Logic
  • 0.7 First-Order Predicate Logic
  • Suggestions for Further Reading
  • 1 An Introduction to Ontology
  • 1.1 Ontology: A Central Subfield of Metaphysics
  • 1.2 The Puzzle of Nonexistent Objects
  • 1.3 Finding One's Ontological Commitments: Quine's Method
  • 1.4 The Method of Paraphrase
  • 1.5 Ockham’s Razor
  • 1.6 Where Should Metaphysical Inquiry Begin?
  • Suggestions for Further Reading
  • 2 Abstract Entities
  • 2.1 More Than a Material World?
  • 2.2 The Abstract/Concrete Distinction
  • 2.3 Universals and the One Over Many Argument
  • 2.4 Applying Quine's Method
  • 2.5 Nominalism and Other Options
  • 2.6 Mathematical Objects
  • Suggestions for Further Reading
  • 3 Material Objects
  • 3.1 What is a 'Material' Object?
  • 3.2 The Paradoxes of Material Constitution
  • 3.3 The Problem of the Many
  • 3.4 The Special Composition Question
  • 3.5 Moderate Answers to the Special Composition Question
  • 3.6 Mereological Nihilism
  • 3.7 Mereological Universalism
  • 3.8 Vagueness
  • 3.9 Back to the Paradoxes
  • Suggestions for Further Reading
  • 4 Critiques of Metaphysics
  • 4.1 A Concern about Methodology
  • 4.2 Carnap's Two Critiques of Metaphysics
  • 4.3 Responses to Carnap's Arguments
  • 4.4 Present Day Worries about Metaphysical Method
  • 4.5 The Relationship Between Metaphysics and Science: A Proposal
  • Suggestions for Further Reading
  • 5 Natural and Social Kinds
  • 5.1 A Traditional Account of Natural Kinds
  • 5.2 The Homeostatic Property Cluster Account
  • 5.3 Social Kinds and Social Reality
  • 5.4 Social Construction
  • 5.5 Constructing Human Kinds
  • 5.6 Causal vs. Constitutive Construction
  • 5.7 What Are We Doing When We Do Social Ontology?
  • Suggestions for Further Reading
  • 6 The Metaphysics of Race and Gender
  • 6.1 Three Views about the Metaphysics of Race and Gender
  • 6.2 Biological Realism about Race
  • 6.3 Social Constructionism or Eliminativism?
  • 6.4 Working Out a Social Constructionism about Race
  • 6.5 Gender and Sex
  • 6.6 Biological Realism about Gender
  • 6.7 Essentialism or Eliminativism?
  • 6.8 Social Constructionism about Gender
  • 6.9 Conferralism about Gender
  • 6.10 A World Without Gender?
  • Suggestions for Further Reading
  • 7 Grounding and Fundamentality
  • 7.1 Fundamentally Questions
  • 7.2 The Mind-Body Problem
  • 7.3 Supervenience
  • 7.4 The Limits of Supervenience
  • 7.5 Grounding
  • 7.6 Fundamentality
  • 7.7 Fundamentality as Ontological Independence
  • 7.8 The Fundamental as a Basis for the Nonfundamental
  • 7.9 Is There a Fundamental Level?
  • Suggestions for Further Reading
  • 8 Time
  • 8.1 Time's Passage
  • 8.2 Background on Special Relativity
  • 8.3 The Argument from Special Relativity Against Presentism
  • 8.4 The A-Theory and the B-Theory
  • 8.5 The Truthmaker Objection
  • 8.6 Time Travel
  • Suggestions for Further Reading
  • 9 Persistence
  • 9.1 The Puzzle of Change
  • 9.2 Some Views about Persistence
  • 9.3 A Solution to the Paradoxes of Material Constitution
  • 9.4 The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics
  • 9.5 Exdurantism
  • 9.6 Defending Three-Dimensionalism
  • Suggestions for Further Reading
  • 10 Modality
  • 10.1 Possibility and Necessity: Modes of Truth
  • 10.2 Varieties of Possibility and Necessity
  • 10.3 The Possible Worlds Analysis of Modality
  • 10.4 Ersatz Modal Realism
  • 10.5 Rejecting the Possible Worlds Analysis
  • 10.6 Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism
  • 10.7 Essentialism Today
  • Suggestions for Further Reading
  • 11 Causation
  • 11.1 Causation in the History of Philosophy
  • 11.2 Hume's Empiricism
  • 11.3 Three Reductive Theories of Causation
  • 11.4 An Objection to Reductive Theories of Causation
  • 11.5 Process Theories of Causation
  • 11.6 Two Projects in the Philosophy of Causation
  • Suggestions for Further Reading
  • 12 Free Will
  • 12.1 What is Free Will?
  • 12.2 The Problem of Free Will and Determinism
  • 12.3 Determinism
  • 12.4 Compatibilism
  • 12.5 Frankfurt Cases
  • 12.6 Manipulation Arguments
  • 12.7 Libertarianism
  • 12.8 Skepticism about Free Will
  • Suggestions for Further Reading
  • Glossary of Terms
  • Works Cited
  • Index