Managerial Economics and Strategy, Global Edition

Höfundar: Jeffrey M. Perloff; James A. Brander (Útgáfa: 4)
Managerial Economics and Strategy, Global Edition

Kaup valmöguleikar

For managerial economics courses. Problem-based learning based on real market data Managerial Economics and Strategy shows how managers can use modern economic theories to address issues they’ll encounter on the job. The authors emphasize problem-solving, together with real-world issues and examples, knowing, from their own teaching experience, that this is often how students learn best. The heavily revised 4th Edition includes many new worked problems, explanations and end-of-chapter questions.

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Útgefandi
Pearson International Content
ISBN
9781292766256
Print ISBN
9781292498560
Format
ePub
Útgáfa
4
Höfundar
Jeffrey M. Perloff; James A. Brander
Tungumál
English
Útgefið
2026-06-30
Prent takmörkun á líftíma
100
Prent takmörkun
2
Afritunar takmörkun
2

Kaflar

  • Cover
  • Cover
  • Front Matter
  • Title page
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • About the Authors
  • Preface
  • Interactive Media Contents
  • Chapter 1: Introduction
  • Introduction
  • 1.1 Managerial Decision Making
  • 1.2 Economic Models
  • 1.3 Using Economic Skills in Your Career
  • Summary
  • Chapter 2: Supply and Demand
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Carbon Taxes
  • 2.1 Demand
  • 2.2 Supply
  • 2.3 Market Equilibrium
  • 2.4 Shocks to the Equilibrium
  • 2.5 Effects of Government Interventions
  • 2.6 When to Use the Supply-and-Demand Model
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Carbon Taxes
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 3: Empirical Methods for Demand Analysis
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Pricing Apple’s Music Downloads
  • 3.1 Elasticity
  • 3.2 Regression Analysis
  • 3.3 Properties and Statistical Significance of Estimated Coefficients
  • 3.4 Regression Specification
  • 3.5 Forecasting
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Estimating the Effect of an iTunes Price Change
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Appendix 3A The Identification Problem
  • Chapter 4: Consumer Choice
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Paying Employees to Relocate
  • 4.1 Consumer Preferences
  • 4.2 Utility
  • 4.3 The Budget Constraint
  • 4.4 Constrained Consumer Choice
  • 4.5 Deriving Demand Curves
  • 4.6 Behavioral Economics
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Paying Employees to Relocate
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Appendix 4A The Marginal Rate of Substitution
  • Appendix 4B The Consumer Optimum
  • Chapter 5: Production
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Labor Productivity During Recessions
  • 5.1 Production Functions
  • 5.2 Short-Run Production
  • 5.3 Long-Run Production
  • 5.4 Returns to Scale
  • 5.5 Innovation
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Labor Productivity During Recessions
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 6: Costs
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Switching to Autonomous Trucking
  • 6.1 The Nature of Costs
  • 6.2 Short-Run Costs
  • 6.3 Long-Run Costs
  • 6.4 The Learning Curve
  • 6.5 The Costs of Producing Multiple Goods
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Switching to Autonomous Trucking
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Appendix 6A Calculating Cost Curves
  • Appendix 6B Long-Run Cost Minimization
  • Chapter 7: Firm Organization and Market Structure
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Amazon’s Delivery Services
  • 7.1 Ownership and Governance of Firms
  • 7.2 Profit Maximization
  • 7.3 Profits Over Time
  • 7.4 The Make or Buy Decision
  • 7.5 Market Structure
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Amazon’s Delivery Services
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 8: Competitive Firms and Markets
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: The Rising Cost of Keeping On Truckin’
  • 8.1 Perfect Competition
  • 8.2 Competition in the Short Run
  • 8.3 Competition in the Long Run
  • 8.4 Competition Maximizes Economic Well-Being
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: The Rising Cost of Keeping On Truckin’
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 9: Monopoly
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Brand-Name and Generic Drugs
  • 9.1 Monopoly Profit Maximization
  • 9.2 Market Power
  • 9.3 Market Failure Due to Monopoly Pricing
  • 9.4 Causes of Monopoly
  • 9.5 Advertising
  • 9.6 Digital Platforms and Internet Monopolies
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Brand-Name and Generic Drugs
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 10: Pricing with Market Power
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Sale Prices
  • 10.1 Conditions for Price Discrimination
  • 10.2 Perfect Price Discrimination
  • 10.3 Group Price Discrimination
  • 10.4 Nonlinear Price Discrimination
  • 10.5 Two-Part Pricing
  • 10.6 Bundling
  • 10.7 Peak-Load Pricing
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Sale Prices
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 11: Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Gaining an Edge from Government Aircraft Subsidies
  • 11.1 Cartels
  • 11.2 Cournot Oligopoly
  • 11.3 Bertrand Oligopoly
  • 11.4 Monopolistic Competition
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Gaining an Edge from Government Aircraft Subsidies
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Appendix 11A Nash-Bertrand Equilibrium
  • Chapter 12: Game Theory and Business Strategy
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Workplace Disasters
  • 12.1 Oligopoly Games
  • 12.2 Types of Nash Equilibria
  • 12.3 Information and Rationality
  • 12.4 Bargaining
  • 12.5 Auctions
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Workplace Disasters
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 13: Strategies Over Time
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Intel and AMD’s Advertising Strategies
  • 13.1 Repeated Games
  • 13.2 Sequential Games
  • 13.3 Deterring Entry
  • 13.4 Cost and Innovation Strategies
  • 13.5 Disadvantages of Moving First
  • 13.6 Behavioral Game Theory
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Intel and AMD’s Advertising Strategies
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Appendix 13A A Mathematical Approach to Stackelberg Oligopoly
  • Chapter 14: Decision-Making Under Uncertainty
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: BP’s Risk and Limited Liability
  • 14.1 Assessing Risk
  • 14.2 Attitudes Toward Risk
  • 14.3 Reducing Risk
  • 14.4 Investing Under Uncertainty
  • 14.5 Behavioral Economics and Uncertainty
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: BP’s Risk and Limited Liability
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 15: Asymmetric Information
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Clawing Back Bonuses
  • 15.1 Adverse Selection
  • 15.2 Reducing Adverse Selection
  • 15.3 Moral Hazard
  • 15.4 Using Contracts to Reduce Moral Hazard
  • 15.5 Using Monitoring to Reduce Moral Hazard
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Clawing Back Bonuses
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 16: Government and Business
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Licensing Inventions
  • 16.1 Market Failure and Government Policy
  • 16.2 Regulation of Imperfectly Competitive Markets
  • 16.3 Antitrust Law and Competition Policy
  • 16.4 Externalities
  • 16.5 Open-Access, Club, and Public Goods
  • 16.6 Intellectual Property
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Licensing Inventions
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 17: Global Business
  • MANAGERIAL PROBLEM: Responding to Exchange Rates
  • 17.1 Reasons for International Trade
  • 17.2 Exchange Rates
  • 17.3 International Trade Policies
  • 17.4 Multinational Enterprises
  • 17.5 Outsourcing
  • MANAGERIAL SOLUTION: Responding to Exchange Rates
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Answers to Selected Questions
  • Chapter 2
  • Chapter 3
  • Chapter 4
  • Chapter 5
  • Chapter 6
  • Chapter 7
  • Chapter 8
  • Chapter 9
  • Chapter 10
  • Chapter 11
  • Chapter 12
  • Chapter 13
  • Chapter 14
  • Chapter 15
  • Chapter 16
  • Chapter 17
  • Definitions
  • Definitions
  • Bibliography
  • Bibliography
  • Sources for Managerial Problems, Mini-Cases, and Managerial Implications
  • Chapter 1
  • Chapter 2
  • Chapter 3
  • Chapter 4
  • Chapter 5
  • Chapter 6
  • Chapter 7
  • Chapter 8
  • Chapter 9
  • Chapter 10
  • Chapter 11
  • Chapter 12
  • Chapter 13
  • Chapter 14
  • Chapter 15
  • Chapter 16
  • Chapter 17
  • Glossary