Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach

Name: Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach
Price: 7700 ISK
Availability: InStock
Author: Hal R. Varian; Marc Melitz
ISBN: 9780393643411

Höfundar: Hal R. Varian; Marc Melitz (Útgáfa: 10)

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The Gold Standard, Now for Today’s Students Varian’s Intermediate Microeconomics, long the gold standard, welcomes new co-author Marc Melitz. Informed by his extensive teaching experience, Melitz incorporates fresh examples and problems to modernize and enhance Varian’s core approach to support today’s students. A new interactive ebook supports provides unique interactives that explain challenging concepts, and Smartwork online assessment tool offers ample opportunities for students to work through problem sets.

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Útgefandi: W. W. Norton

ISBN: 9780393643411

Print ISBN: 9781324034292

Format: ePub

Útgáfa: 10

Höfundar: Hal R. Varian; Marc Melitz

Tungumál: English

Útgefið: 2024-07-01

Prent takmörkun á líftíma: 100

Prent takmörkun: 2

Afritunar takmörkun: 2

Flokkar: Hagfræði Viðskiptafræði

Efnisflokkar: Viðskipti og hagfræði › Rekstrarhagfræði Viðskipti og hagfræði › Almennt

Kaflar

Cover
Publisher’s Notice
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
Contents in Brief
Contents
Preface
About the Authors
Chapter 1: The Market
1.1 Constructing a Model
1.2 Optimization and Equilibrium
1.3 The Demand Curve
1.4 The Supply Curve
1.5 Market Equilibrium
1.6 Comparative Statics
1.7 Other Ways to Allocate Apartments
1.8 Which Way Is Best?
1.9 Pareto Efficiency
1.10 Comparing Ways to Allocate Apartments
1.11 Rent Control in the Real World
1.12 Equilibrium in the Long Run
Chapter Review
Chapter 2: Budget Constraint
2.1 The Budget Constraint
2.2 Two Goods Are Often Enough
2.3 Properties of the Budget Set
2.4 How the Budget Line Changes
2.5 The Numeraire
2.6 Taxes, Subsidies, and Rationing
2.7 Budget Line Changes
Chapter Review
Chapter 3: Preferences
3.1 Consumer Preferences
3.2 Assumptions about Preferences
3.3 Indifference Curves
3.4 Examples of Preferences
3.5 Well-Behaved Preferences
3.6 The Marginal Rate of Substitution
3.7 Other Interpretations of the MRS
3.8 Behavior of the MRS
Chapter Review
Chapter 4: Utility
4.1 Cardinal Utility
4.2 Constructing a Utility Function
4.3 Some Examples of Utility Functions
4.4 Marginal Utility
4.5 Marginal Utility and MRS
4.6 An Example from the Electric Vehicle Industry
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 5: Choice
5.1 Optimal Choice
5.2 Consumer Demand
5.3 Some Examples
5.4 Using a Utility Function to Estimate the Welfare Impact of Price Changes
5.5 Implications of the MRS Condition
5.6 Choosing Taxes
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 6: Demand
6.1 Normal and Inferior Goods
6.2 Income Offer Curves and Engel Curves
6.3 Some Examples
6.4 Ordinary Goods and Giffen Goods
6.5 The Price Offer Curve and the Demand Curve
6.6 Some Examples
6.7 Substitutes and Complements
6.8 The Inverse Demand Function
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 7: Revealed Preference
7.1 The Idea of Revealed Preference
7.2 From Revealed Preference to Preference
7.3 Recovering Preferences
7.4 The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
7.5 Checking WARP
7.6 The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference
7.7 How to Check SARP
7.8 Index Numbers
7.9 Price Indices
Chapter Review
Chapter 8: Slutsky Equation
8.1 The Substitution Effect
8.2 The Income Effect
8.3 Sign of the Substitution Effect
8.4 The Total Change in Demand
8.5 Rates of Change
8.6 The Law of Demand
8.7 Examples of Income and Substitution Effects
8.8 Another Substitution Effect
8.9 Compensated Demand Curves
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 9: Buying and Selling
9.1 Net and Gross Demands
9.2 The Budget Constraint
9.3 Changing the Endowment
9.4 Price Changes
9.5 Food Bank Exchanges and the Gains from Trade
9.6 The Slutsky Equation Revisited
9.7 Use of the Slutsky Equation
9.8 Labor Supply
9.9 Comparative Statics of Labor Supply
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 10: Intertemporal Choice
10.1 The Budget Constraint
10.2 Preferences for Consumption
10.3 Comparative Statics
10.4 The Slutsky Equation and Intertemporal Choice
10.5 Inflation
10.6 Present Value: A Closer Look
10.7 Analyzing Present Value for Several Periods
10.8 Use of Present Value
10.9 Bonds
10.10 Taxes
10.11 Choice of the Interest Rate
Chapter Review
Chapter 11: Asset Markets
11.1 Rates of Return
11.2 Arbitrage and Present Value
11.3 Adjustments for Differences among Assets
11.4 Assets with Consumption Returns
11.5 Taxation of Asset Returns
11.6 Market Bubbles
11.7 Applications
11.8 Financial Institutions
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 12: Uncertainty
12.1 Contingent Consumption
12.2 Utility Functions and Probabilities
12.3 Expected Utility
12.4 Why Expected Utility Is Reasonable
12.5 Risk Aversion
12.6 Diversification
12.7 Risk Spreading
12.8 Role of the Stock Market
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 13: Risky Assets
13.1 Mean-Variance Utility
13.2 Measuring Risk
13.3 Counterparty Risk
13.4 Equilibrium in a Market for Risky Assets
13.5 How Returns Adjust
Chapter Review
14 Consumer’s Surplus
14.1 Demand for a Discrete Good
14.2 Constructing Utility from Demand
14.3Other Interpretations of Consumer’s Surplus
14.4From Consumer’s Surplus to Consumers’ Surplus
14.5 Approximating a Continuous Demand
14.6 Quasilinear Utility
14.7Interpreting the Change in Consumer’s Surplus
14.8 Compensating and Equivalent Variation
14.9Producer’s Surplus
14.10 Benefit-Cost Analysis
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 15: Market Demand
15.1 From Individual to Market Demand
15.2 The Inverse Demand Function
15.3 Discrete Goods
15.4 The Extensive and the Intensive Margin
15.5 Elasticity
15.6 Elasticity and Demand
15.7 Elasticity and Revenue
15.8 Constant Elasticity Demands
15.9 Elasticity and Marginal Revenue
15.10 Marginal Revenue Curves
15.11 Income Elasticity
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 16: Equilibrium
16.1 Supply
16.2 Market Equilibrium
16.3 Two Special Cases
16.4 Inverse Demand and Supply Curves
16.5 Comparative Statics
16.6 Taxes
16.7 Passing Along a Tax
16.8 The Deadweight Loss of a Tax
16.9 Pareto Efficiency
Chapter Review
Chapter 17: Measurement
17.1 Summarize Data
17.2 Test
17.3 Estimating Demand Using Experimental Data
17.4 Effect of Treatment
17.5 Estimating Demand Using Observational Data
17.6 Identification
17.7 What Can Go Wrong?
17.8 Policy Evaluation
Chapter Review
Chapter 18: Auctions
18.1 Classification of Auctions
18.2 Auction Design
18.3 Other Auction Forms
18.4 Position Auctions
18.5 Should You Advertise on Your Brand?
18.6 Auction Revenue and Number of Bidders
18.7 Problems with Auctions
18.8The Winner’s Curse
18.9 Stable Matching Problem
18.10 Mechanism Design
Chapter Review
Chapter 19: Technology
19.1 Inputs and Outputs
19.2 Describing Technological Constraints
19.3 Examples of Technology
19.4 Properties of Technology
19.5 The Marginal Product
19.6 The Technical Rate of Substitution
19.7 Diminishing Marginal Product
19.8 Diminishing Technical Rate of Substitution
19.9 The Long Run and the Short Run
19.10 Returns to Scale
Chapter Review
Chapter 20: Profit Maximization
20.1 Profits
20.2 The Organization of Firms
20.3 Profits and Stock Market Value
20.4 The Boundaries of the Firm
20.5 Fixed and Variable Factors
20.6 Short-Run Profit Maximization
20.7 Comparative Statics
20.8 Profit Maximization in the Long Run
20.9 Inverse Factor Demand Curves
20.10 Profit Maximization and Returns to Scale
20.11 Revealed Profitability
20.12 Cost Minimization
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 21: Cost Minimization
21.1 Cost Minimization
21.2 Revealed Cost Minimization
21.3 Returns to Scale and the Cost Function
21.4 Long-Run and Short-Run Costs
21.5 Fixed and Overhead Costs
21.6 Sunk Costs
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 22: Cost Curves
22.1 Average Costs
22.2 Marginal Costs
22.3 Marginal Costs and Variable Costs
22.4 Cost Curves for Online Auctions
22.5 Long-Run Costs
22.6 Discrete Levels of Plant Size
22.7 Long-Run Marginal Costs
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 23: Firm Supply
23.1 Market Environments
23.2 Pure Competition
23.3 The Supply Decision of a Competitive Firm
23.4 An Exception
23.5 Another Exception
23.6 The Inverse Supply Function
23.7Profits and Producer’s Surplus
23.8 The Long-Run Supply Curve of a Firm
23.9 Overhead Costs in the Long Run
23.10 Long-Run Constant Average Costs
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 24: Industry Supply
24.1 Short-Run Industry Supply
24.2 Industry Equilibrium in the Short Run
24.3 Industry Equilibrium in the Long Run
24.4 The Long-Run Supply Curve
24.5 The Meaning of Zero Profits
24.6 Fixed Factors and Economic Rent
24.7 What Determines Economic Rent?
24.8 The Politics of Rent
24.9 Industry Supply with Different Technologies: Electricity Generation
Chapter Review
Chapter 25: Monopoly
25.1 Maximizing Profits
25.2 Linear Demand Curve and Monopoly
25.3 Markup Pricing
25.4 Inefficiency of Monopoly
25.5 Deadweight Loss of Monopoly
25.6 Patents
25.7 Natural Monopoly
25.8 What Causes Monopolies?
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 26: Monopoly Behavior
26.1 Price Discrimination
26.2 First-Degree Price Discrimination
26.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination
26.4 Third-Degree Price Discrimination
26.5 Bundling
26.6 Two-Part Tariffs
26.7 Monopolistic Competition
26.8 A Location Model of Product Differentiation
Chapter Review
Chapter 27: Factor Markets
27.1 Monopoly in the Output Market
27.2 Monopsony
27.3 The Minimum Wage
27.4 Upstream and Downstream Monopolies
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 28: Oligopoly
28.1 Choosing a Strategy
28.2 Quantity Leadership
28.3 Price Leadership
28.4 Comparing Price Leadership and Quantity Leadership
28.5 Simultaneous Quantity Setting
28.6 An Example of Cournot Equilibrium
28.7 Adjustment to Equilibrium
28.8 Many Firms in Cournot Equilibrium
28.9 Simultaneous Price Setting
28.10 Collusion
28.11 Punishment Strategies
28.12 Comparison of the Solutions
Chapter Review
Chapter 29: Game Theory
29.1 The Payoff Matrix of a Game
29.2 Nash Equilibrium
29.3 Mixed Strategies
29.4The Prisoner’s Dilemma
29.5 Repeated Games
29.6 Enforcing a Cartel
29.7 Sequential Games
29.8 A Game of Entry Deterrence
29.9 Supplier Hold-Up
Chapter Review
Chapter 30: Game Applications
30.1 Best Response Curves
30.2 Mixed Strategies
30.3 Games of Coordination
30.4 Games of Competition
30.5 Games of Coexistence
30.6 Games of Commitment
30.7 Bargaining
Chapter Review
Chapter 31: Behavioral Economics
31.1 Framing Effects in Consumer Choice
31.2 Uncertainty
31.3 Time
31.4 Strategic Interaction and Social Norms
31.5 Assessment of Behavioral Economics
Chapter Review
Chapter 32: Exchange
32.1: The Edgeworth Box
32.2: Trade
32.3: Pareto Efficient Allocations
32.4: Market Trade
32.5: The Algebra of Equilibrium
32.6Walras’s Law
32.7: Relative Prices
32.8: The Existence of Equilibrium
32.9: Equilibrium and Efficiency
32.10: The Algebra of Efficiency
32.11: Efficiency and Equilibrium
32.12: Implications of the First Welfare Theorem
32.13: Implications of the Second Welfare Theorem
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 33: Production
33.1 The Robinson Crusoe Economy
33.2 Crusoe, Inc.
33.3 The Firm
33.4 Robinson’s Problem
33.5 Putting Them Together
33.6 Different Technologies
33.7 Production and the First Welfare Theorem
33.8 Production and the Second Welfare Theorem
33.9 Production Possibilities
33.10 Comparative Advantage
33.11 Pareto Efficiency
33.12 Castaways, Inc.
33.13 Robinson and Friday as Consumers
33.14 Decentralized Resource Allocation
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 34: Welfare
34.1 Aggregation of Preferences
34.2 Social Welfare Functions
34.3 Welfare Maximization
34.4 Individualistic Social Welfare Functions
34.5 Fair Allocations
34.6 Envy and Equity
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 35: Externalities
35.1 Smokers and Nonsmokers
35.2 Quasilinear Preferences and the Coase Theorem
35.3 Production Externalities
35.4 Interpretation of the Conditions
35.5 Market Signals
35.6 Pollution Taxes and Pollution Permit Trading
35.7 The Tragedy of the Commons
Chapter Review
Chapter 36: Public Goods
36.1 When to Provide a Public Good
36.2 Private Provision of the Public Good
36.3 Free Riding
36.4 Different Levels of the Public Good
36.5 Quasilinear Preferences and Public Goods
36.6 The Free Rider Problem
36.7 Comparison to Private Goods
36.8 Voting
36.9 The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
36.10 Examples of VCG
36.11 Problems with the VCG
Chapter Review
Appendix
Chapter 37: Asymmetric Information
37.1 The Market for Lemons
37.2 Quality Choice
37.3 Adverse Selection
37.4 Moral Hazard
37.5 Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
37.6 Signaling
37.7 Incentives
37.8 Asymmetric Information
Chapter Review
Chapter 38: Information Technology
38.1 Systems Competition
38.2 The Problem of Complements
38.3 Lock-In
38.4 Network Externalities
38.5 Market Dynamics
38.6 Implications of Network Externalities
38.7 Two-sided Markets
Chapter Review
Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Functions
A.2 Graphs
A.3 Properties of Functions
A.4 Inverse Functions
A.5 Equations and Identities
A.6 Linear Functions
A.7 Changes and Rates of Change
A.8 Slopes and Intercepts
A.9 Absolute Values and Logarithms
A.10 Derivatives
A.11 Second Derivatives
A.12 The Product Rule and the Chain Rule
A.13 Partial Derivatives
A.14 Optimization
A.15 Constrained Optimization
Answers
Index