Institutional Economics

Höfundur: Stefan Voigt (Útgáfa: 0)
Institutional Economics

Kaup valmöguleikar

Why is it that some countries become rich while others remain poor? Do markets require regulation to function efficiently? If markets offer an efficient way of exchanging goods, why do individuals even create firms? How are economic transactions organized in the absence of a state that could enforce contracts and guarantee property rights? Institutional economics has allowed social scientists to answer many fundamental questions about the organization and functioning of societies.

This introduction to institutional economics is concise, yet easy to understand. It not only caters to students of economics but to anybody interested in this topical research area and its specific subfields. Both formal and informal institutions (such as customs, habits, and traditions) are discussed with respect to their causes and consequences, highlighting the important part they play for economic growth and development.

Nánar um bókina

Útgefandi
Cambridge University Press
ISBN
9781108683395
Print ISBN
9781108473248
Format
Page Fidelity (PDF)
Útgáfa
0
Höfundar
Stefan Voigt
Tungumál
English
Útgefið
2019-04-11
Prent takmörkun á líftíma
10
Flokkar
Hagfræði

Kaflar

  • Half-title
  • Title page
  • Copyright information
  • Brief Contents
  • Detailed Contents
  • Figures
  • Tables
  • Preface
  • Introduction
  • 1 The Basics
  • 1.1 The Standard Behavioral Model of Economics - and a Few Modifications Made by New Institutional E
  • 1.1.1 From Perfect to Bounded Rationality
  • 1.1.2 Transaction Costs
  • 1.2 Institutions: Functions, Types, and Interrelationships
  • 1.2.1 Definitions of Institutions
  • 1.2.1.1 Characteristics of Rules
  • 1.2.1.2 Types of Enforcement
  • 1.2.2 Interactions between Internal and External Institutions
  • 1.3 Research Questions
  • 1.4 The Toolkit of Institutional Economists
  • 1.4.1 Game Theory: A Tool for Analyzing Strategic Interaction Situations
  • 1.4.1.1 A Coordination Game
  • 1.4.1.2 A Mixed-Motive Game: The Prisoner's Dilemma
  • 1.4.2 Comparative Institutional Analysis
  • 1.4.3 Experiments in the Laboratory or the Field
  • 1.4.4 Case Studies Including Economic History
  • 1.4.5 Econometric Tests
  • 1.5 NIE's Common Ground with and Differences from Other Research Programs
  • 1.6 Open Questions
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 2 Simple Transactions
  • 2.1 The Relevance of External Institutions for Simple Transactions
  • 2.1.1 The Coase Theorem
  • 2.2 The Relevance of Internal Institutions for Simple Transactions
  • 2.2.1 Example 1: Norms of Cooperation and the Ultimatum Game
  • 2.2.2 Example 2: Fairness Notions and Price Formation
  • 2.3 The Relevance of Interplay between External and Internal Institutions for Simple Transactions
  • 2.3.1 Conflicting External and Internal Institutions
  • 2.3.2 Complementary External and Internal Institutions
  • 2.3.3 Substitutive Relationship between External and Internal Institutions
  • 2.3.4 Empirical Results on the Relationship between External and Internal Institutions
  • 2.4 On the Estimation of Transaction Costs
  • 2.4.1 Estimations of the Size of the Informal Sector
  • 2.5 Open Questions
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 3 Repeated and Long-Term Transactions: On the Choice of Governance Structures with Given Institution
  • 3.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 3.2 From a Black Box to the Firm as a Team
  • 3.3 Problems Associated with Asymmetric Information: The Principal-Agent Theory
  • 3.4 Transaction Cost Economics
  • 3.5 The Firm as a Collection of Assets
  • 3.6 The Relevance of Internal Institutions
  • 3.6.1 Example 1: Corporate Culture: On the Coordination of Interaction Situations within Firms
  • 3.6.2 Example 2: On the Relevance of Reciprocity in Labor Relations
  • 3.7 Open Questions
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 4 Institutions and Collective Action
  • 4.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 4.2 Explaining Politicians' Behavior Under Given Institutions
  • 4.2.1 Preliminary Remarks
  • 4.2.2 Example 1: Rent Seeking
  • 4.2.3 Example 2: Political Business Cycles
  • 4.2.4 The Dilemma of the Strong State
  • 4.3 Explaining Collective Action Using Internal Institutions
  • 4.3.1 From Non-Repeated to Repeated Games
  • 4.3.2 Evidence from the Laboratory
  • 4.4 The Interplay between External and Internal Institutions and its Relevance for Collective Action
  • 4.5 Open Questions
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 5 The Relevance of Institutions for Growth and Development
  • 5.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 5.2 Determinants of Economic Growth: Institutions, Geography, Culture?
  • 5.2.1 Institutions
  • 5.2.2 Geography
  • 5.2.3 Culture
  • 5.3 The Relevance of External Institutions for Economic Growth and Development
  • 5.3.1 How to Measure External Institutions
  • 5.3.2 Early Attempts to Measure External Institutions
  • 5.3.3 One Measurement Attempt in Detail
  • 5.3.3.1 Preliminary Remarks
  • 5.3.3.2 The Economic Freedom Index
  • Size of Government
  • Legal System and Property Rights
  • Sound Money
  • Freedom to Trade Internationally
  • Extent of Regulation in Banking, Labor, and Business
  • Method of Evaluation
  • 5.3.3.3 Criticisms of the Economic Freedom Index
  • 5.3.4 Results of Empirical Studies
  • 5.3.5 Institutions or Policies?
  • 5.4 The Relevance of Internal Institutions for Economic Growth and Development
  • 5.5 On the Interplay between External and Internal Institutions and its Relevance for Economic Growt
  • 5.6 Open Questions
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • Appendix A Ten-Minute Primer in Econometrics
  • 6 Explaining Differences in External Institutions across Societies
  • 6.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 6.2 Origins and Change of Property Rights: A Traditional View
  • 6.3 Origins of and Change in Property Rights and the State: Accounting for Political Economy Factors
  • 6.4 Explaining Differences in Institutions
  • 6.4.1 Preliminary Remarks
  • 6.4.2 Explaining External Institutions Based on Geography
  • 6.4.3 Explaining External Institutions Based on Culture or History
  • 6.4.4 Explaining External Institutions Based on Social Conflict View
  • 6.5 Institutional Change via Institutional Competition?
  • 6.6 Elements of a General Theory
  • 6.6.1 Preliminary Remarks
  • 6.6.2 Satisficing Behavior
  • 6.6.3 Collective Action Problems
  • 6.6.4 Path Dependency of Institutional Change
  • 6.6.5 Political Transaction Costs
  • 6.6.6 The Relative Power of the Relevant Actors
  • 6.6.7 The Relevance of Internal Institutions
  • 6.6.8 A Short Summary
  • 6.7 Open Questions
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 7 Explaining Change in Internal Institutions
  • 7.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 7.2 The Problem in Economic Terms
  • 7.3 Hypotheses on the Origins of Norms
  • 7.3.1 Evolutionary Approaches
  • 7.3.2 Repetition or Reputation as Explanatory Factor?
  • 7.3.3 An Attempted Synthesis
  • 7.3.3.1 Regular Behavior
  • 7.3.3.2 Interdependent Utility Functions
  • 7.3.3.3 Norms of Cooperation
  • 7.3.3.4 Concerning the Sanctioning Component
  • 7.3.3.5 Outlook
  • 7.4 Potential Triggers for Change in Internal Institutions
  • 7.4.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 7.4.2 Geography Again
  • 7.4.3 External Institutions
  • 7.5 Open Questions
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 8 On the Need for Normative Theory
  • 8.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 8.2 What is Normative Theory and Why Should We Study It?
  • 8.3 Two Competing Normative Concepts
  • 8.3.1 The Welfare Theoretical Approach
  • 8.3.2 Hypothetical Consent: A Heuristic to Derive Normative Statements
  • 8.3.3 Some Critical Comments on the Unanimity Test
  • 8.4 Requirements for a Normative Theory from the Perspective of Institutional Economics
  • 8.4.1 The Approach of Williamson
  • 8.4.2 The Approach of Hayek
  • 8.4.3 Consequences of the Two Approaches
  • 8.5 Open Questions
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 9 Consequences for Economic Policy
  • 9.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 9.2 Policy Recommendations: The Traditional - Na├»ve - Approach
  • 9.3 Activation of Internal Institutions through Government Action?
  • 9.3.1 A Specific Example: Voluntary Commitment Declarations
  • 9.4 Policy Reforms in Practice: Case Study of New Zealand
  • 9.4.1 The Initial Situation in New Zealand
  • 9.4.2 Overview of the Most Important Reforms
  • 9.4.3 Explaining the Reforms
  • 9.4.3.1 Underlying Theories
  • 9.4.3.2 Persons Involved
  • 9.4.3.3 Behavior-Channeling Institutions, Relevant Organizations
  • 9.4.3.4 Favorable Circumstances
  • 9.5 Open Questions
  • Questions
  • Further Reading
  • 10 Outlook
  • 10.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 10.2 Institutions and Mental Models
  • 10.3 Institutions and Ideas
  • 10.4 Institutions and Individuals
  • 10.5 Institutions beyond the Nation-State
  • 10.6 Institutions and Identification
  • 10.7 Where to Turn to Start Your Own Research?
  • Further Reading
  • References
  • Index