How Dictatorships Work

Höfundar: Barbara Geddes; Joseph Wright; Erica Frantz (Útgáfa: 0)
How Dictatorships Work

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This accessible volume shines a light on how autocracy really works by providing basic facts about how post-World War II dictatorships achieve, retain, and lose power. The authors present an evidence-based portrait of key features of the authoritarian landscape with newly collected data about 200 dictatorial regimes. They examine the central political processes that shape the policy choices of dictatorships and how they compel reaction from policy makers in the rest of the world.

Importantly, this book explains how some dictators concentrate great power in their own hands at the expense of other members of the dictatorial elite. Dictators who can monopolize decision making in their countries cause much of the erratic, warlike behavior that disturbs the rest of the world. By providing a picture of the central processes common to dictatorships, this book puts the experience of specific countries in perspective, leading to an informed understanding of events and the likely outcome of foreign responses to autocracies.

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Útgefandi
Cambridge University Press
ISBN
9781108691871
Print ISBN
9781107115828
Format
Page Fidelity (PDF)
Útgáfa
0
Höfundar
Barbara Geddes; Joseph Wright; Erica Frantz
Tungumál
English
Útgefið
2018-08-23
Prent takmörkun á líftíma
10

Kaflar

  • Half-title
  • Title page
  • Copyright information
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • Acknowledgments
  • 1 Introduction
  • Implementing Our Definition of Regime
  • The Groups That Initiate Dictatorships
  • Seizures Led by a Group of Military Officers
  • Seizures Led by Parties
  • Seizures Led by What Becomes a Ruling Family
  • Conflict and Bargaining within the Seizure Group
  • Plan of the Book
  • Appendix Coding Rules for Authoritarian Regimes
  • Part I Initiation
  • 2 Autocratic Seizures of Power
  • Who Do Dictatorial Seizure Groups Oust?
  • How Dictatorships Begin
  • Before the Seizure of Power
  • The Morning after a Seizure of Power
  • Post-Seizure Organization
  • Conclusion
  • 3 What Do We Know about Coups?
  • Coups for Various Purposes
  • Preconditions Associated with Regime-Change Coups
  • Inequality and Coups
  • Conclusion
  • Part II Elite Consolidation
  • 4 Power Concentration: The Effect of Elite Factionalism on Personalization
  • Elite Bargaining in Dictatorships
  • Handing Power to a Leader
  • The Dictator's Interests
  • The Interests of Other Members of the Inner Circle
  • Bargaining over the Distribution of Resources and Power
  • Characteristics That Influence the Credibility of Threats to Oust the Dictator
  • Measuring Personalism
  • Patterns of Personalism
  • The Effect of Factionalism on the Personalization of Power
  • Conclusion
  • 5 Dictatorial Survival Strategies in Challenging Conditions: Factionalized Armed Supporters and Part
  • The Strategic Context
  • The Interaction of Dispersed Arms and Factionalism
  • The Strategic Creation of New Political Actors
  • Evidence That Post-Seizure Party Creation Aims to Counterbalance Factionalized Armed Supporters
  • Is Party Creation Usually Initiated by the Dictator?
  • Is Post-Seizure Party Creation Part of a Military Marginalization Strategy?
  • Can More United Militaries Deter Party Creation?
  • Is Party Creation Part of a Strategy to Reduce the Dictator's Vulnerability to Coups?
  • Post-Seizure Party Creation and Dictatorial Survival
  • The Effect of Post-Seizure Party Creation on the Likelihood of Coups
  • Conclusion
  • Part III Ruling Society: Implementation and Information Gathering
  • 6 Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
  • Implementation, Monitoring, and Information Gathering
  • Elite Competition and Institutions That Engage Citizens
  • Parties
  • The Limitations of Dictatorial Ruling Parties
  • Why Dictatorial Ruling Parties Persist
  • Dictatorial Legislatures
  • Elections
  • Tests of the Effects of Elections
  • Conclusion
  • 7 Double-Edged Swords: Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and Coercion
  • Internal Security Agencies
  • The Dangers of Personalized Control of Internal Security
  • The Army: Bulwark of the Regime or Incubator of Plots?
  • Counterbalancing
  • Controlling Military Leadership
  • The Relationship between Counterbalancing and Interference
  • Conclusion
  • Part IV Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
  • 8 Why Dictatorships Fall
  • How Dictatorships End
  • Individual Support and Opposition
  • The Interests of Regime Insiders
  • The Interests of Others
  • Perceptions about Regime Survival
  • The Effect of Crisis on Decisions to Oppose the Dictatorship
  • Economic Crisis and Breakdown
  • Empirical Approach
  • Power Concentration and Regime Survival
  • Data and Measurement
  • Empirical Approach
  • Results
  • Leadership Changes and Regime Breakdown
  • Death of the Dictator and Regime Survival
  • The Dictator's Future and the Likelihood of Democratization
  • The Costs of Losing Power
  • Costs of Losing Power in Military-Led Dictatorships
  • The Costs of Losing Power in Party-Led Dictatorships
  • Costs of Losing Power for Monarchs
  • The Effect of Personalization on Prospects for Democracy
  • Personalism in Military-Led Regimes
  • Conclusion
  • 9 Conclusion and Policy Implications
  • References
  • Index