Group Agency
Kaup valmöguleikar
Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individual agents that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should go about explaining the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable in the manner of individuals. Group Agency offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, in a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences.
Christian List and Philip Pettit take the line that there really are group or corporate agents, over and above the individual agents who compose them, and that a proper social science and a proper approach to law, morality, and politics have to take account of this fact. Unlike some earlier defences of group agency, their account is entirely unmysterious in character and, despite not being technically difficult, is grounded in cutting-edge work in social choice theory, economics, and philosophy.
Nánar um bókina
- Oxford University Press Academic UK
- 9780191618628
- 9780199591565
- Page Fidelity (PDF)
- 0
- Christian List; Philip Pettit
- English
- 2011-04-07
- 100
- 2
- 2
Kaflar
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- For realism about group agents
- The historical novelty of our form of group-agent realism
- Methodological implications, positive and normative
- Part I. The Logical Possibility of Group Agents
- 1. The Conditions of Agency
- 1.1 A basic account of agency
- 1.2 Complications in agency
- 1.3 The idea of group agency
- 2. The Aggregation of Intentional Attitudes
- 2.1 A paradox of majoritarian attitude aggregation
- 2.2 An impossibility result
- 2.3 Escape routes from the impossibility
- 3. The Structure of Group Agents
- 3.1 The organizational structure of a group agent
- 3.2 The supervenience of a group agent
- 3.3 The unmysterious autonomy of the group agent
- Part II. The Organizational Design of Group Agents
- 4. The Epistemic Desideratum
- 4.1 Formulating the epistemic desideratum
- 4.2 Satisfying the epistemic desideratum
- 4.3 Complications
- 5. The Incentive-Compatibility Desideratum
- 5.1 Formulating the incentive-compatibility desideratum
- 5.2 Satisfying the incentive-compatibility desideratum
- 5.3 Two routes to incentive compatibility
- 6. The Control Desideratum
- 6.1 Formulating the control desideratum
- 6.2 Satisfying the control desideratum
- 6.3 Broader lessons
- Part III. The Normative Status of Group Agents
- 7. Holding Group Agents Responsible
- 7.1 Fitness to be held responsible
- 7.2 The fitness of group agents to be held responsible
- 7.3 Individual and corporate responsibility
- 8. Personifying Group Agents
- 8.1 The conception of personhood
- 8.2 Group agents as persons
- 8.3 Group persons and respect
- 9. Identifying With Group Agents
- 9.1 Identification and self-identification
- 9.2 Corporate identification and self-identification
- 9.3 Multiple identities
- References
- Endnotes
- General Index
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- Name Index
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