Games of Strategy

Höfundar: Avinash K. Dixit; Susan Skeath; David McAdams (Útgáfa: 6)
Games of Strategy

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Invites all students to understand game theory From the minds of renowned economists Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath, and David McAdams comes the Sixth Edition of the most approachable game theory text, rooted in rigorous research and engaging examples. Assuming no prior knowledge of game theory—only a principles level of economic education—and exposure to only high-school level algebra, this book’s examples appeal to students of all different interests and experiences while maintaining an empirical approach.

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Útgefandi
W. W. Norton
ISBN
9781324087151
Print ISBN
9781324087137
Format
ePub
Útgáfa
6
Höfundar
Avinash K. Dixit; Susan Skeath; David McAdams
Tungumál
English
Útgefið
2025-06-10
Prent takmörkun á líftíma
100
Prent takmörkun
2
Afritunar takmörkun
2
Flokkar
Hagfræði

Kaflar

  • Cover
  • Publisher’s Notice
  • Title Page
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Part One: Introduction and General Principles
  • Chapter 1: Basic Ideas and Examples
  • 1 What is a Game of Strategy?
  • 2 Some Examples and Stories of Strategic Games
  • 3 Our Strategy for Studying Games of Strategy
  • Chapter 2: How to Think about Strategic Games
  • 1 Strategic Games
  • 2 Classifying Games
  • 3 Some Terminology and Background Assumptions
  • 4 The Uses of Game Theory
  • 5 The Structure of the Chapters to Follow
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Part Two: Fundamental Concepts and Techniques
  • Chapter 3: Games with Sequential Moves
  • 1 Game Trees
  • 2 Solving Games by Using Trees
  • 3 Adding More Players
  • 4 Order Advantages
  • 5 Adding More Moves
  • 6 Evidence Concerning Rollback
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Chapter 4: Simultaneous-Move Games: Discrete Strategies
  • 1 Depicting Simultaneous-Move Games with Discrete Strategies
  • 2 Nash Equilibrium
  • 3 Dominance
  • 4 Stronger and Weaker Forms of Dominance
  • 5 Best-Response Analysis
  • 6 Three Players
  • 7 Multiple Equilibria in Pure Strategies
  • 8 No Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Chapter 5: Simultaneous-Move Games: Continuous Strategies, Discussion, and Evidence
  • 1 Pure Strategies that are Continuous Variables
  • 2 Critical Discussion of the Nash Equilibrium Concept
  • 3 Rationalizability
  • 4 Empirical Evidence Concerning Nash Equilibrium
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Appendix: Finding a Value to Maximize a Function
  • Chapter 6: Combining Sequential and Simultaneous Moves
  • 1 Changing the Order of Moves in a Game
  • 2 Alternative Methods of Analysis
  • 3 Three-Player Games
  • 4 Games with Both Simultaneous and Sequential Moves
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Chapter 7: Simultaneous-Move Games: Mixed Strategies
  • 1 What is a Mixed Strategy?
  • 2 Mixing in Zero-Sum Games
  • 3 Nash Equilibrium as a System of Beliefs and Responses
  • 4 Mixing in Non-Zero-Sum Games
  • 5 General Discussion of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
  • 6 Mixing When One Player has Three or More Pure Strategies
  • 7 Mixing When Both Players have Three Strategies
  • 8 How to Use Mixed Strategies in Practice
  • 9 Evidence on Mixing
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Appendix: Working with Probabilities
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Part Three: Some Broad Classes of Strategies and Games
  • Chapter 8: Strategic Moves
  • 1 A Classification of Strategic Moves
  • 2 Commitments
  • 3 Threats and Promises
  • 4 Some Additional Topics
  • 5 Making Your Strategic Moves Credible
  • 6 Countering Your Opponent’s Strategic Moves
  • 7 Direct Communication, or “Cheap Talk”
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Chapter 9: Uncertainty and Information
  • 1 Strategies for Dealing with Risk
  • 2 Asymmetric Information: Basic Ideas
  • 3 Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Screening
  • 4 Signaling in the Labor Market
  • 5 Equilibria in Two-Player Signaling Games
  • 6 Two-Way Asymmetric Information and Dynamic Chicken
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Appendix: Inferring Probabilities from Observing Consequences
  • Chapter 10: The Prisoners’ Dilemma and Repeated Games
  • 1 The Prisoners’ Dilemma (Review)
  • 2 Changing Payoffs: Morality, Penalties, and Rewards
  • 3 Changing the Order of Moves: Promises
  • 4 Changing the Way Moves are Made: Repetition
  • 5 Experimental Evidence
  • 6 Real-World Dilemmas
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Appendix: Infinite Sums
  • Chapter 11: Collective-Action Games
  • 1 A Brief History and Summary of Key Ideas
  • 2 Collective-Action Games with Two Players
  • 3 Collective-Action Problems in Large Groups
  • 4 Spillover Effects, or Externalities
  • 5 “Help!”: A Game of Chicken with Mixed Strategies
  • 6 Further Reading
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Chapter 12: Evolutionary Games
  • 1 The Framework
  • 2 Some Classic Games in an Evolutionary Setting
  • 3 The Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
  • 4 The Hawk–Dove Game
  • 5 Evolution of Cooperation and Altruism
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Part Four: Applications to Specific Strategic Situations
  • Chapter 13: Brinkmanship: The Cuban Missile Crisis
  • 1 A Brief Narrative of Events
  • 2 A Simple Game-Theoretic Explanation
  • 3 Brinkmanship with Well-Controlled Risk
  • 4 Brinkmanship with Uncontrolled Risk: A Game of Dynamic Chicken
  • 5 Practicing Brinkmanship
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Chapter 14: Design of Incentives
  • 1 Price Discrimination
  • 2 Some Terminology
  • 3 Information-Revealing Contracts
  • 4 Evidence Concerning Information-Revelation Mechanisms
  • 5 Incentives for Effort: The Simplest Case
  • 6 Incentives for Effort: Evidence and Extensions
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Chapter 15: Auctions, Bidding Strategy, and Auction Design
  • 1 What are Auctions?
  • 2 The Winner’s Curse
  • 3 Bidding in Auctions
  • 4 Auction Design
  • 5 Externalities in Auctions
  • 6 Further Reading
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Appendix: Computing Bidding Equilibria
  • Chapter 16: Strategy and Voting
  • 1 Voting Rules and Procedures
  • 2 Voting Paradoxes
  • 3 Evaluating Voting Systems
  • 4 Strategic Voting
  • 5 The Median Voter Theorem
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Chapter 17: Bargaining
  • 1 The Nash Cooperative Solution
  • 2 Variable-Threat Bargaining
  • 3 Alternating-Offers Model I: Total Value Decays
  • 4 Alternating-Offers Model II: Impatience
  • 5 Evidence on Bargaining
  • 6 Manipulating Information in Bargaining
  • 7 Bargaining with Many Parties and Issues
  • Summary and Key Terms
  • Exercises
  • Glossary
  • Index