Ethics and Behavioural Economics
Kaup valmöguleikar
Atferlishagfræði er meira en safn sálfræðilegra sérkenna og bjagana í ákvarðanatöku. Í þessari bók er gengið lengra og því haldið fram að hún sé rammi til að meta hvernig raunverulegt fólk tekur ákvarðanir innan stofnana sem aðrir hafa mótað. Þegar valkostir okkar ráðast af sjálfgefnum stillingum, framsetningu, sýnileika, viðmiðunarpunktum, félagslegum samanburði, skorti og sjálfvirkni er ekki lengur hægt að fresta siðferðilegu mati þar til hagfræðileg greining liggur fyrir.
Bókin byggist á skýrum fimm þrepa ramma sem liggur til grundvallar öllum köflum hennar. Fyrst er greint hvaða hugræni gangur er að verki, síðan hvaða hegðun hann leiðir af sér og hvaða stofnun eða aðili mótar valumhverfið. Þá eru metin áhrif þess á velferð einstaklings þegar val hans samræmist ekki raunverulegum óskum hans. Að lokum er lagt mat á hvort áhrifin séu gagnsæ, afturkræf og samrýmist virðingu fyrir einstaklingnum sem verður fyrir þeim.
Lesendur fá hnitmiðað verkfærasafn fyrir siðferðilegt mat, meðal annars úr afleiðingahyggju, skyldusiðfræði, kenningum um sjálfræði, dygðasiðfræði og umfjöllun um réttlæti og skiptingu gæða, án þess að þurfa fyrst að ljúka heilu námskeiði í siðfræði. Þessum nálgunum er beitt á raunhæf dæmi á borð við sjálfgefna valkosti í lífeyrismálum, lána- og kreditvörur, áskriftargildrur, reiknirit við ráðningar, verðlagningu trygginga, reglur um upplýsingagjöf og velferðarkerfi.
Bókin gerir einnig skýran greinarmun á þremur stigum mats: hinu siðferðilega, þar sem spurt er hvort áhrifin séu réttlætanleg; hinu lagalega, þar sem metið er hvað lög ættu að heimila, krefjast eða banna; og hinu stjórnunarlega, þar sem spurt er hvað ábyrg stofnun ætti í raun að gera, jafnvel þegar lög leyfa ágengari háttsemi. Þessi aðgreining dregur úr tveimur algengum mistökum: að gera ráð fyrir að allt sem er löglegt sé siðferðilega rétt og að allt sem er siðferðilega vafasamt eigi að banna.
Behavioural economics is more than a catalogue of psychological quirks and biases in how we decide. This book makes a sharper claim: it is a framework for evaluating how real people make choices inside institutions that other people have designed. Once our options are shaped by defaults, framing, salience, anchors, social comparison, scarcity, and automation, ethical analysis can no longer be postponed until the economics is settled.
The book runs on a clear five-step framework that threads through every chapter. Identify the cognitive mechanism at work, trace the behaviour it produces, pinpoint the institution or actor shaping the environment, weigh what happens to a person's welfare when choice and genuine preference diverge, and finally judge whether the influence is transparent, reversible, and consistent with respect for the person being influenced.
Readers get a compact ethical toolkit — from consequentialism and deontology to autonomy theory, virtue ethics, and questions of justice and distribution — without first having to wade through a full course in moral philosophy. These frameworks are put to work on concrete cases: pension defaults, credit products, subscription traps, algorithmic hiring tools, insurance pricing, disclosure rules, and welfare programmes.
The book also draws a clean line between three levels of evaluation: the ethical (is the influence justified?), the regulatory (what should the law permit, require, or prohibit?), and the managerial (what should a responsible institution actually do, even when the law allows more aggressive behaviour?). Keeping these apart guards against two common errors — assuming that whatever is legal must be ethical, and assuming that whatever is ethically questionable must be banned.
Nánar um bókina
- Rafbókin
- 9789935350800
- 9789935350800
- ePub
- 1
- Erlendur Ingi Jónsson
- English
- 2026-06-04
- 100
- 10
- 10
Kaflar
- Ethics and Behavioural Economics
- Copyright and Publication Data
- Preface
- A Note on Drafting Assistance
- How to Use This Book
- The Central Framework of This Book
- A Short Ethical Toolkit
- Ethics, Regulation, and Managerial Judgment
- Contents
- Why Economics Needed a Rethink
- 1.1 Classical Utility: From Bentham to Samuelson
- 1.2 Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Axiomatic Turn
- 1.3 The Allais Paradox
- 1.4 Herbert Simon and Bounded Rationality
- 1.5 Kahneman and Tversky: Heuristics and Biases
- 1.6 The Linda Problem and the Conjunction Fallacy
- 1.7 Prospect Theory: A First Look
- 1.8 Richard Thaler and the Market Consequences
- 1.9 The Dual-Process Framework
- 1.10 What Behavioural Economics Claims and Does Not Claim
- 1.11 The Rationalist Response
- 1.12 A Map of Competing Models of Choice
- 1.13 Descriptive and Normative Claims
- CHAPTER 2 Heuristics, Biases, and Market Implications
- 2.1 Representativeness
- WORKED EXAMPLE: Base Rates in a Loan-Default Screen
- Base-Rate Neglect in Finance and Medicine
- The Conjunction Fallacy
- Hot Hands and Momentum Illusions
- 2.2 Availability
- 2.3 Anchoring and Adjustment
- Anchoring in Professional Judgement
- Anchoring and Reference Prices in Consumer Markets
- 2.4 Overconfidence
- Overconfidence in Financial Markets
- 2.5 How Individual Biases Produce Market Phenomena
- 2.6 Evidence Calibration: What Is Robust, What Is Context-Sensitive?
- 2.7 Regulatory Implications: From Disclosure to Consumer Duty
- CHAPTER 3 Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion
- 3.1 Three Empirical Failures of Expected Utility Theory
- The Certainty Effect
- The Reflection Effect
- The Isolation Effect
- 3.2 The Value Function
- 3.3 The Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
- 3.4 Status Quo Bias
- 3.5 Mental Accounting
- 3.6 Probability Weighting
- 3.7 Framing Effects and the Asian Disease Problem
- 3.8 The Evolution of the Value Function
- Panel 1: Expected Value
- Panel 2: Neoclassical Utility
- Panel 3: The Prospect Theory Value Function
- What Changes Across the Three Models
- 3.9 The Probability Weighting Function: Numbers on a Table
- 3.10 A Compact Numerical Illustration
- 3.11 What Is Robust and What Is Debated?
- 3.12 After 1979: Cumulative Prospect Theory and Expectation-Based Reference Points
- 3.13 Loss Aversion in the Wild: Four Domains
- Labour Markets and Nominal Wage Rigidity
- Real Estate Markets
- Professional Golf
- Organ Donation Defaults
- 3.14 The Ethics of Reference Point Engineering
- CHAPTER 4 Social Preferences and Fairness
- 4.1 The Ultimatum Game
- 4.2 Public Goods Games and Costly Punishment
- 4.3 Models of Social Preferences
- Inequity Aversion: Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
- Reciprocity: Rabin (1993)
- Combining Mechanisms: Fehr and Schmidt Extended and Charness-Rabin
- 4.4 Fairness in Labour Markets
- 4.5 Consumer Fairness and Market Pricing
- 4.6 Fairness, Efficiency, and the Ethics of Redistribution
- 4.7 Descriptive Fairness and Normative Justice
- 4.8 Cross-Cultural Caution
- CHAPTER 5 Nudge Theory and Behavioural Policy
- 5.1 What a Nudge Is
- 5.2 The Mechanism Behind Defaults
- The Save More Tomorrow Programme
- 5.3 Social Norm Interventions
- 5.4 The EAST Framework and Policy Applications
- 5.5 Beyond Defaults: Simplification and Salience
- 5.6 Commitment Devices
- 5.7 The Limits of Nudging: What the Evidence Also Shows
- 5.8 When Nudges Fail or Backfire
- 5.9 Heterogeneous Effects and Distributional Burden
- 5.10 Public Policy and Commercial Choice Architecture
- CHAPTER 6 The Ethics of Nudging
- 6.1 The Autonomy Objection
- 6.2 The Welfare Standard Problem
- 6.3 Means and Ends: When Does Influence Become Manipulation?
- 6.4 Dark Patterns: When the Architecture Works Against You
- 6.5 Behavioural Insights in Government: Accountability Questions
- 6.6 The Slippery Slope: Nudging and Coercion
- 6.7 An Evaluative Framework for Nudges
- 6.8 Transparency, Consent, and Contestability
- 6.9 Existing Frameworks and the Position of This Book
- 6.10 Financial Services Examples
- 6.11 Nudging, Manipulation, and Respect for Persons: Where the Debate Stands
- CHAPTER 7 Intertemporal Choice and Self-Control
- 7.1 Hyperbolic Discounting
- 7.2 Worked Example: Exponential and Present-Biased Discounting
- 7.3 Present Bias, Liquidity Constraints, and Exploitation
- 7.4 Sophistication, Naivety, and Partial Self-Knowledge
- 7.5 The Planner-Doer Model
- 7.6 Credit Markets and the Architecture of Debt
- 7.7 Intertemporal Choice in Health
- 7.8 The Ethics of Intervening on the Self
- CHAPTER 8 Behavioural Finance
- 8.1 Efficient Markets as the Benchmark
- 8.2 Why Mispricings Survive: The Limits of Arbitrage
- 8.3 Noise Traders, Sentiment, and Excess Volatility
- 8.4 Investor Attention and Salience
- 8.5 Overconfidence and Excessive Trading
- 8.6 Herding, Information Cascades, and Career Concerns
- 8.7 Asset Bubbles: Narratives, Leverage, and Feedback Loops
- 8.8 Momentum, Reversal, and the Factor Zoo
- 8.9 The Equity Premium Puzzle and Myopic Loss Aversion
- 8.10 The Disposition Effect and Reference-Point Pricing
- 8.11 Home Bias, Mental Accounting, and Portfolio Choice
- 8.12 Behavioural Finance in Pension and Savings Design
- 8.13 Institutional Investors and the Limits of Smart Money
- 8.14 Trading Platforms, Gamification, and Ethical Risk
- 8.15 Regulatory Implications
- 8.16 Evidence Strength Across Behavioural Finance Anomalies
- CHAPTER 9 Behavioural Ethics in Organisations
- 9.1 Bounded Ethicality and Its Mechanisms
- 9.2 Moral Licensing and the Slippery Slope
- 9.3 What Incentive Structures Actually Do
- 9.4 Groups, Diffusion of Responsibility, and Obedience to Authority
- 9.5 Designing Institutions for Ethical Behaviour
- 9.6 Governance Mechanisms That Change Behaviour
- 9.7 Professional Identity and Role Morality
- 9.8 Professional Ethics and the Problem of Role Conflict
- CHAPTER 10 AI, Algorithms, and Ethical Risk
- 10.1 What Algorithmic Bias Means
- 10.2 Opacity and the Right to Explanation
- 10.3 Accountability and the Problem of Many Hands
- 10.4 Automation and the Ethics of Human Oversight
- 10.5 Generative AI: New Risks, Same Architecture
- 10.6 Model Governance and Auditability
- 10.7 Legal Note: GDPR and the EU AI Act
- 10.8 Worked Example: Credit Scoring
- 10.9 Generative AI and Behavioural Manipulation
- CHAPTER 11 Poverty, Inequality, and Behavioural Policy
- 11.1 The Scarcity Mindset
- 11.2 Structural Constraints First
- 11.3 Behavioural, Structural, and Mixed Interventions
- 11.4 Administrative Burden and Take-Up
- 11.5 Poverty Traps and Behavioural Mechanisms
- 11.6 Conditional Cash Transfers and Behavioural Design
- 11.7 The Distributional Ethics of Nudging
- 11.8 Applying the Evaluative Framework
- CHAPTER 12 Synthesis: What Behavioural Economics Means for Ethics and Policy
- 12.1 What Behavioural Economics Does to Welfare Economics
- 12.2 Autonomy Revisited
- 12.3 The Limits of the Behavioural Approach
- 12.4 What Remains
- 12.5 When Frameworks Conflict: A Guide for Practitioners
- 12.6 What Algorithmic Governance Requires
- 12.7 Final Practitioner Checklist
- 12.8 The Final Position
- End-of-Part Integrative Cases and Assessment Bank
- Case 1: The Pension Default
- Case 2: The Subscription Trap
- Case 3: The Trading App
- Case 4: The Automated Credit Model
- Short Examination Questions
- Numerical Practice Questions
- Suggested Essay Questions
- Glossary of Key Terms
- Appendix: How to Read Behavioural Economics Evidence
- A.1 Laboratory Experiments: Design and Validity
- A.2 Effect Sizes and Statistical Power
- A.3 Pre-Registration and the Replication Crisis
- A.4 Field Experiments and Natural Experiments
- A.5 Meta-Analyses and What They Tell Us
- References