Economics for Competition Lawyers

Höfundar: Gunnar Niels; Helen Jenkins; James Kavanagh (Útgáfa: 3)
Economics for Competition Lawyers

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Competition law is rooted in economic theory, and economics provides many of the standard tools often applied in competition investigations. As a result, a strong foundation in economics is an invaluable asset for practitioners in this area of law. This is the third edition of the popular and well-regarded practitioner guide to the economic principles of competition law. Written in accessible language for non-technical readers, it covers first economic principles by applying them directly to competition cases.

It covers all major topics in competition law where economics is relevant: the core themes of market definition, market power and dominance, mergers, and anti-competition practice, as well as less familiar but important areas such as state aid, remedy design, damages, and use of experts in competition cases. Topics are introduced by posing compelling questions based on real cases from around the world.

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Útgefandi
Oxford University Press Academic UK
ISBN
9780192655509
Print ISBN
9780198851332
Format
ePub
Útgáfa
3
Höfundar
Gunnar Niels; Helen Jenkins; James Kavanagh
Tungumál
English
Útgefið
2023-07-28
Prent takmörkun á líftíma
100
Prent takmörkun
2
Afritunar takmörkun
2

Kaflar

  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Contents
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • Table of Cases
  • Table of Legislation
  • List of Abbreviations
  • 1. Introduction: Starting from First Principles
  • 1.1 You and Competition Economics
  • 1.2 What Does Economics Contribute to Competition Law?
  • 1.3 The Book’s Approach to Explaining Competition Economics
  • 1.4 Some Health Warnings on Competition, Competition Policy, and Competition Economists
  • 1.5 What’s New in this Third Edition?
  • 2. The Competition Economics Toolkit
  • 2.1 Why Start with a Toolkit?
  • 2.2 Demand, Supply, Where They Meet, and What that Means for Competition
  • 2.3 More on Demand and Supply: Substitution, Elasticities, Competition, and Monopoly
  • 2.4 Oligopoly Theory: Strategic Interaction and Coordination
  • 2.5 Network Economics
  • 2.6 Behavioural Economics
  • 2.7 Econometrics and Regression Analysis
  • 3. Market Definition
  • 3.1 Why Market Definition?
  • 3.2 Dimensions of the Relevant Market
  • 3.3 The Hypothetical Monopolist Test
  • 3.4 Critical Loss Analysis
  • 3.5 The Cellophane Fallacy
  • 3.6 Supply-side Substitution and Market Aggregation
  • 3.7 Price Discrimination Markets
  • 3.8 Chains of Substitution
  • 3.9 Other Aspects of Geographic Market Definition
  • 3.10 Market Definition for Complements and Bundles
  • 3.11 Market Definition for Two-sided Platforms
  • 3.12 Markets Along the Vertical Supply Chain
  • 3.13 Product Substitution Versus Product Migration
  • 3.14 Market Definition on Features Other than Price
  • 3.15 Conclusion: Why Market Definition?
  • 4. Market Power
  • 4.1 A Central Concern in Competition Law
  • 4.2 Market Power Thresholds in Competition Law
  • 4.3 Market Power Thresholds Outside Competition Law
  • 4.4 Market Shares and Concentration Measures
  • 4.5 Classic Entry Barriers: Economies of Scale, Sunk Costs, and Product Differentiation
  • 4.6 Modern Entry Barriers: IP, Data, and Network Effects
  • 4.7 Profitability as a Measure of Market Power
  • 4.8 Buyer Power and Bidding Markets
  • 4.9 Behavioural Economics and Market Power
  • 4.10 Market Power and Innovation in Dynamic Markets
  • 5. Abuse of Dominance
  • 5.1 Successful Competitor or Bull in a China Shop?
  • 5.2 General Principles for Assessing Exclusionary Conduct
  • 5.3 Cost Benchmarks for Exclusionary Conduct
  • 5.4 Predation
  • 5.5 Price Discrimination
  • 5.6 Loyalty and Exclusivity Rebates
  • 5.7 Margin Squeeze
  • 5.8 Bundling and Tying
  • 5.9 Refusal to Supply and Essential Facilities
  • 5.10 Abuse of Dominance by Digital Platforms
  • 5.11 Excessive Pricing
  • 6. Cartels and Other Horizontal Agreements
  • 6.1 Are All Cartels Bad?
  • 6.2 Economic Characteristics of Hardcore Cartels
  • 6.3 Information Exchange Between Competitors
  • 6.4 Counterfactuals and Restrictions: The Interchange Fee and Pay-for- Delay Cases
  • 6.5 Cooperation Among Competitors: Joint Purchasing, Joint Selling, and R&D and Technology Agreements
  • 6.6 Green Deals: Exemptions for Horizontal Cooperation on Environmental Objectives?
  • 6.7 Horizontal Agreements in Labour Markets
  • 6.8 Collusion by Algorithms
  • 6.9 Finding Cartels: How Can Economics Help?
  • 7. Vertical Restraints
  • 7.1 Business Practices, the Law, and the Economics
  • 7.2 Economic Rationales for Vertical Restraints
  • 7.3 Is a Restraint a Restriction? Counterfactual Analysis under Article 101(1)
  • 7.4 Foreclosure Effects of Vertical Restraints
  • 7.5 Hardcore and Object Vertical Restraints: Resale Price Maintenance and Exclusive Territories
  • 7.6 Vertical Restraints in Digital Markets: Online Distribution Systems
  • 7.7 Vertical Restraints in Digital Markets: Most-favoured-nation Clauses
  • 8. Mergers
  • 8.1 Mergers Under Scrutiny
  • 8.2 The Substantive Test: SLC, SIEC, and Other Variants
  • 8.3 The Counterfactual: Current Market, Failing Firm, or Future Entry?
  • 8.4 Unilateral Effects: Assessing Closeness of Competition
  • 8.5 Unilateral Effects: Simulating Price Rises
  • 8.6 Coordinated Effects
  • 8.7 Dynamic Effects of Mergers
  • 8.8 Non-horizontal Mergers
  • 8.9 Minority Shareholdings and Common Ownership
  • 8.10 Merger Efficiencies
  • 9. Design of Remedies
  • 9.1 After the Diagnosis, What’s the Cure?
  • 9.2 Structural Remedies in Mergers
  • 9.3 Structural Remedies in Conduct Cases
  • 9.4 Behavioural Remedies: Price and Access
  • 9.5 Behavioural Remedies: FRAND
  • 9.6 Behavioural Remedies: Insights from Behavioural Economics
  • 9.7 Setting Fines
  • 9.8 Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Remedies, and of Competition Law
  • 10. Quantification of Damages
  • 10.1 Damages Claims, Economics, and the Law
  • 10.2 Harm from Hardcore Cartels: Main Principles
  • 10.3 Harm from Exclusionary Conduct: Main Principles
  • 10.4 A Classification of Methods and Models for Quantifying Damages
  • 10.5 Comparator-based Approaches: Cross-sectional
  • 10.6 Comparator-based Approaches: Time Series
  • 10.7 Comparator-based Approaches: Difference-in-Differences
  • 10.8 Approaches Based on Financial Analysis
  • 10.9 Approaches Based on Market Structure and IO Theory
  • 10.10 Pass-on of Overcharges
  • 10.11 Class Actions: Certification with (not in) Economics
  • 10.12 Interest and Discounting
  • 11. The Use of Economic Evidence in Competition Cases
  • 11.1 Hired Guns and Mud-slingers?
  • 11.2 Best Practice in Presenting Economic Evidence
  • 11.3 Economists in Court: When Can You Rely on Them?
  • 11.4 Economists in Court: Do They Get a Fair Hearing?
  • 11.5 The Use of Economics in Competition Law: A Promising Future?
  • Bibliography
  • Index