Constitutional Economics

Höfundur: Stefan Voigt (Útgáfa: 0)
Constitutional Economics

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Constitutional political economy has emerged as an indispensable part of political economy. This book offers a concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to this topic. What effects – if any – do constitutions have within autocracies? Can small electoral districts help reduce corruption? Does a country's leadership affect the size of its government? Can direct democratic institutions increase politicians' accountability to citizens?

Stefan Voigt, a pioneer in the field, explores these questions and more throughout the course of this cutting-edge primer. As the number of courses in constitutional economics continues to grow, this book fills an important gap in the literature. This highly original project maintains curiosity about the questions it generates, identifying potential new areas of research whilst successfully demonstrating the impact constitutional rules have on political economy.

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Útgefandi
Cambridge University Press
ISBN
9781108808125
Print ISBN
9781108486880
Format
ePub
Útgáfa
0
Höfundar
Stefan Voigt
Tungumál
English
Útgefið
2020-06-18
Prent takmörkun á líftíma
10
Prent takmörkun
2
Afritunar takmörkun
2
Flokkar
Hagfræði

Kaflar

  • Cover
  • Half title
  • Title page
  • Imprints page
  • Brief Contents
  • Detailed Contents
  • Figures
  • Tables
  • Preface
  • Introduction
  • 1 Conceptual Foundations
  • 1.1 Constitutional Political Economy As Part of the New Institutional Economics
  • 1.2 Definitions
  • 1.3 Concepts of the Constitution
  • 1.3.1 The Constitution As a Social Contract
  • 1.3.2 The Constitutional Contract As Principal–Agent Relationship
  • 1.3.3 The Constitutional Contract As a Precommitment Device
  • 1.3.4 The Constitution As a Bundle of Conventions
  • 1.3.5 The Constitution As the Result of an Evolutionary Process
  • 1.3.6 Summary
  • 1.4 The Tools
  • 1.4.1 Theory
  • 1.4.2 Empirics
  • 1.5 More Potentially Useful Tools
  • 1.5.1 Experiments
  • 1.5.2 Possible Consequences of Constitutional Rules
  • 1.6 Consequences of Constitutional Rules
  • 1.7 Measuring Constitutions
  • 2 Democracy vs. Autocracy
  • 2.1 How Best to Separate Democracy from Autocracy?
  • 2.2 What Role Do Constitutions Play in Autocracy?
  • 2.3 Do Autocracies and Democracies Perform Differently?
  • 2.3.1 Theory
  • 2.3.2 Empirical Evidence
  • 2.3.2.1 Use Adequate Estimation Techniques
  • 2.3.2.2 Ask More Precise Questions
  • 2.4 Do We Have Good Reasons to Assume That Different Kinds of Autocracies Perform Differently?
  • 2.4.1 Theory
  • 2.4.2 Empirical Evidence
  • 2.5 What Are the (Economic) Effects of Extending the Franchise?
  • 2.6 What Factors Make a Country Switch from One Regime to Another?
  • 2.6.1 Theory
  • 2.6.2 Empirical Evidence
  • 2.7 Summary and Outlook
  • 3 Positive Constitutional Economics
  • 3.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 3.2 Basic Rights
  • 3.2.1 Defining Rights
  • 3.2.2 Effects of Basic Rights
  • 3.2.2.1 Theory
  • 3.2.2.2 Empirics
  • 3.2.3 Determinants of Basic Rights
  • 3.2.3.1 Theory
  • 3.3 Horizontal Separation of Powers
  • 3.3.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 3.3.2 Branches of Government
  • 3.3.3 Form of Government: Presidential vs. Parliamentary Regimes
  • 3.3.3.1 Effects of Forms of Government
  • 3.3.3.2 Determinants of Forms of Government
  • 3.3.3.2.1 Theory
  • 3.3.3.2.2 Empirics
  • 3.3.4 The Structure of the Legislature: Bicameralism
  • 3.3.4.1 Effects of Bicameralism
  • 3.3.4.1.1 Theory
  • 3.3.4.1.2 Empirics
  • 3.3.4.2 Determinants of Bicameralism
  • 3.3.5 A Forgotten Branch: The Judiciary
  • 3.3.5.1 The (Economic) Effects of the Judiciary
  • 3.3.5.1.1 Theory
  • 3.3.5.1.2 Empirics
  • 3.3.5.2 Determinants of Judicial Independence
  • 3.3.5.2.1 Theory
  • 3.3.5.2.2 Empirics
  • 3.4 Vertical Separation of Powers: Federalism
  • 3.4.1 Definitions
  • 3.4.2 Effects of Federalism
  • 3.4.2.1 Theory
  • 3.4.2.2 Empirics
  • 3.4.3 Determinants of Federalism
  • 3.4.3.1 Theory
  • 3.4.3.2 Empirics
  • 3.5 The New Separation of Powers: Increasing the Number of Independent Decision-Makers
  • 3.6 Representative vs. Direct Democracy
  • 3.6.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 3.6.2 Effects of Direct Democracy
  • 3.6.2.1 Theory
  • 3.6.2.2 Empirics
  • 3.6.2.2.1 First-Generation Research: Focusing on the United States and Switzerland
  • 3.6.2.2.2 Second-Generation Research: Cross-Country Studies
  • 3.6.2.2.3 Third-Generation Research: Taking Endogeneity Seriously
  • 3.6.3 Determinants of Direct Democracy
  • 3.7 Electoral Systems
  • 3.7.1 Effects of Electoral Systems
  • 3.7.1.1 Theory
  • 3.7.1.2 Empirics
  • 3.7.2 Determinants of Electoral Systems
  • 3.8 Summary
  • 4 Conclusions and Possible Future Issues
  • 4.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 4.2 Conclusions
  • 4.3 Rules for Choosing and Amending Constitutions
  • 4.3.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 4.3.2 Rules for Choosing Constitutions
  • 4.3.2.1 Choice of Members
  • 4.3.2.2 Size of Assembly
  • 4.3.2.3 Time Limits
  • 4.3.2.4 Public or Secret Meetings
  • 4.3.2.5 Voting Rules
  • 4.3.2.6 Public Participation
  • 4.3.3 Procedural Rules for Changing Rules
  • 4.4 Mind the Gap: Analyzing the Divergence between Constitutional Text and Constitutional Reality
  • 4.4.1 Preliminary Remarks
  • 4.4.2 How to Define and Measure the Gap?
  • 4.4.3 Possible Determinants of the Gap: Theory
  • 4.4.4 Challenges for Establishing Causality
  • 4.4.5 Attempts to Analyze the Gap: Empirics
  • 4.5 Emergency Constitutions
  • 4.5.1 Introductory Remarks
  • 4.5.2 Measurement Issues
  • 4.5.3 Who Uses Emergency Constitutions?
  • 4.5.4 Are Emergency Constitutions Effective?
  • 4.5.5 Summary and Possible Implications for Future Research
  • Appendices
  • Appendix 1 Coding Countries according to Two Governance Scores
  • Appendix 2 Empirical Results at a Glance: Constitutional Rules As Explanatory Variables and Cross-Country Results Unless Otherwise Noted
  • References
  • Index