Behavioral Economics

Name: Behavioral Economics
Price: 7390 ISK
Availability: InStock
Author: Edward Cartwright
ISBN: 9781003804703

Höfundur: Edward Cartwright (Útgáfa: 4)

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Á undanförnum áratugum hefur atferlishagfræði valdið byltingu innan hagfræðinnar. Hún hefur fært mannlega þáttinn aftur inn í fræðigreinina með því að viðurkenna að fólk gerir stundum mistök, lætur sér annt um aðra og er almennt ekki jafn kuldalegt og útreiknað og hagfræðingar hafa löngum gert ráð fyrir. Niðurstöðurnar hafa verið spennandi og áhugaverðar og gerbreytt sýn okkar á efnahagslega hegðun.

Í þessari kennslubók eru nemendur kynntir fyrir helstu niðurstöðum og innsýn atferlishagfræðinnar. Fjallað er ítarlega um hugmyndir á borð við huglægt bókhald, væntingakenningu, skammtímahneigð, ójöfnuðarfælni og nám. Hugmyndunum er jafnframt beitt við fjölbreyttar aðstæður, svo sem uppboð, hrun á hlutabréfamörkuðum, framlög til góðgerðarmála og heilbrigðisþjónustu, til að sýna hvers vegna atferlishagfræði er lykillinn að skilningi á heiminum í kringum okkur.

Einnig er fjallað um hvað stuðlar að hamingju fólks og hvernig hugsanlega megi hnippa því í átt að aukinni hamingju. Í þessari nýju útgáfu hefur umfjöllun um ýmis viðfangsefni og hagnýtingu þeirra verið aukin og uppfærð, meðal annars um svik og netglæpi, rafmyntir, upplýsingamiðlun um lýðheilsu og COVID-19-heimsfaraldurinn. Bókin er áfram kjörin inngangsbók í atferlishagfræði fyrir nemendur í framhaldsnámi og á efri stigum grunnnáms.

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Útgefandi: Taylor & Francis

ISBN: 9781003804703

Print ISBN: 9781032414102

Format: ePub

Útgáfa: 4

Höfundar: Edward Cartwright

Tungumál: English

Útgefið: 2024-01-22

Prent takmörkun á líftíma: 100

Prent takmörkun: 2

Afritunar takmörkun: 2

Flokkar: Stjórnmálafræði Sálfræði Viðskiptafræði

Efnisflokkar: Stjórnmálafræði › Almennt Fræðsluefni fyrir börn › Sálfræði Sálfræði › Hugræn taugavísindi og hugræn taugasálfræði Viðskipti og hagfræði › Félags- & Atferlisfræði

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Cover
Half Title
Series
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Detailed contents
List of figures
List of tables
List of research methods boxes
About the author
Preface
Part I Introduction
1 An introduction to behavioral economics
1.1 The history and controversies of behavioral economics
1.1.1 Behavioral economics is reborn
1.1.2 Behavioral economics and policy
1.1.3 The different faces of behavioral economics
1.1.4 Debate and controversy
1.1.5 Too far or not far enough
1.2 Some background on behavioral economics methods
1.2.1 Some background on experiments
1.2.2 Some background on theory
1.2.3 Some background on field studies and experimetrics
1.3 How to use this book
1.3.1 Chapter previews
1.3.2 Behavioral finance
1.4 Further reading
1.5 Review questions
Part II Economic behavior
2 Simple heuristics for complex choices
2.1 Utility and search
2.1.1 How to search
2.1.2 Choice arbitrariness
2.2 Mental accounting and framing
2.2.1 Reference-dependent utility
2.2.2 The endowment effect
2.2.3 Willingness to pay or accept
2.2.4 Transaction utility
2.2.5 Narrow framing
2.2.6 Hedonic editing
2.2.7 Choice bracketing
2.3 The role of emotions
2.3.1 Aversion to lying
2.3.2 Deception
2.3.3 Honesty and framing
2.4 Summary
2.5 Demand, supply and markets
2.5.1 Double-auction markets in the lab
2.5.2 Posted offer markets and market power
2.5.3 The law of one price
2.6 Labor supply and reference dependence
2.6.1 A target income and target wage
2.6.2 Taxicab drivers
2.6.3 Female labor supply
2.7 The housing market
2.7.1 Reluctance to sell
2.7.2 What are buyers willing to pay?
2.8 The behavioral life cycle hypothesis
2.8.1 Fungibility and mental accounting
2.9 Saving for the future
2.9.1 Let’s diversify
2.9.2 Let’s not diversify
2.10 Further reading
2.11 Review questions
3 Choice with risk
3.1 Expected utility
3.1.1 The Allais paradox
3.1.2 Risk aversion
3.1.3 Risk-loving for losses
3.1.4 When expected utility will work
3.2 Independence and fanning out
3.2.1 Disappointment
3.2.2 Rank-dependent expected utility
3.3 Reference dependence and prospect theory
3.3.1 Reference-dependent utility
3.3.2 The reference point and expectations
3.3.3 Combined gambles
3.3.4 Stochastic reference point
3.4 Preference reversals
3.4.1 Procedural invariance
3.4.2 Regret theory
3.4.3 Prospect theory and preference reversals
3.4.4 Why preference reversals matter
3.5 Summary
3.6 Financial trading
3.6.1 The equity premium puzzle
3.6.2 The disposition effect
3.6.3 The ostrich effect
3.7 Insurance
3.8 Tax evasion
3.8.1 Standard model of tax evasion
3.8.2 Behavioral theories of tax evasion
3.8.3 Taxes and reference points
3.8.4 Tax evasion in the laboratory
3.9 Legal settlements
3.9.1 Fourfold pattern of risk attitudes
3.9.2 Frivolous litigation
3.10 Further reading
3.11 Review questions
4 Choosing when to act
4.1 Exponential discounting
4.1.1 The discount factor
4.1.2 The utility of sequences
4.2 Hyperbolic discounting
4.2.1 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting
4.2.2 The consequences of time inconsistency
4.2.3 Temptation and self-control
4.3 Loss aversion and sequences
4.3.1 Reference dependence
4.3.2 Preferences for sequences
4.4 Time and risk
4.5 Summary
4.6 Borrowing and saving
4.6.1 Saving equals growth or growth equals saving?
4.6.2 Why save when you have debts?
4.7 Firm pricing and membership fees
4.7.1 Time inconsistency and consumer behavior
4.7.2 Firm pricing
4.7.3 Choosing the correct calling plan
4.8 Fraud and cybercrime
4.8.1 Social engineering and persuasion
4.8.2 Time pressure, impulse and procrastination
4.9 Environmental economics
4.9.1 Inter-generational discount factor
4.9.2 Reducing CO2 emissions
4.10 Further reading
4.11 Review questions
5 Learning from new information
5.1 Bayesian updating and choice with uncertainty
5.1.1 Models of choice with uncertainty
5.1.2 The Ellsberg paradox
5.2 Two cognitive biases
5.2.1 Confirmatory bias
5.2.2 A model of confirmatory bias
5.2.3 Law of small numbers
5.2.4 A model of the law of small numbers
5.2.5 Generating random sequences
5.2.6 Do biases matter?
5.3 Learning from others
5.3.1 To conform or not
5.3.2 Cascade experiments
5.3.3 What happened to conformity?
5.3.4 Signaling games
5.4 Summary
5.5 Health care
5.5.1 Patients
5.5.2 Practitioners
5.5.3 Public health messaging
5.6 Asset price bubble and crash
5.6.1 Bubbles in the lab
5.6.2 Experience and bubbles
5.6.3 Explaining bubbles
5.6.4 Cryptocurrency
5.7 Voting in elections
5.8 Further reading
5.9 Review questions
6 Interacting with others
6.1 The beauty contest
6.1.1 Strategy and Nash equilibrium
6.1.2 Choice in a beauty contest
6.1.3 Learning in a beauty contest
6.2 Playing for the first time
6.2.1 Level-k thinking
6.2.2 Sophisticated beliefs
6.2.3 Focal points
6.2.4 Equilibrium refinement
6.2.5 Nash equilibrium with mistakes
6.3 Learning from experience
6.3.1 Reinforcement learning
6.3.2 Belief-based learning
6.3.3 Experience-weighted learning
6.3.4 Learning and prediction
6.4 Teams make decisions
6.4.1 Teams and the beauty contest
6.4.2 The sophistication of teams
6.4.3 Are teams smarter?
6.5 Summary
6.6 Auctions
6.6.1 Revenue equivalence
6.6.2 Winner’s curse
6.7 Learning to coordinate
6.7.1 Weakest link games
6.7.2 Threshold public good games
6.7.3 Coordinating on networks
6.8 Monetary policy by committee
6.9 Industrial organization
6.9.1 Limit pricing
6.9.2 Market entry
6.9.3 Quantity leadership
6.10 Further reading
6.11 Review questions
7 Social preferences
7.1 The experimental evidence for social preferences
7.1.1 The nice side of social preferences
7.1.2 The nasty side of social preferences
7.1.3 Reciprocity
7.1.4 Fairness and competition
7.1.5 The terminology of reciprocity
7.1.6 Social preferences and teams
7.2 Inequality aversion
7.2.1 Inequality aversion with incomplete information
7.2.2 Inequality aversion with complete information
7.2.3 An evaluation of inequality aversion models
7.3 Intentions and social norms
7.3.1 A model of fairness based on intentions
7.3.2 What is fair?
7.4 Summary
7.5 Giving to charity
7.5.1 Crowding out
7.5.2 Who is watching?
7.5.3 Why do people give?
7.5.4 Social norms and crowding out
7.6 Price and wage rigidity
7.6.1 A model of worker reciprocity
7.6.2 Wage stickiness in the lab
7.6.3 How long to forget a wage change?
7.6.4 Firm pricing
7.7 Contract theory
7.7.1 Contracts for loss-averse workers
7.7.2 Exploitation of an overconfident worker
7.8 Further reading
7.9 Review questions
Part III Origins of behavior
8 Evolution and culture
8.1 Evolution and economic behavior
8.1.1 Looking for food and finding a utility function
8.1.2 Choosing when to have children
8.1.3 Aggregate risk
8.1.4 Competing with others
8.2 Culture and multi-level selection
8.2.1 Cross-culture comparisons
8.2.2 Group selection
8.2.3 Gene–culture coevolution
8.2.4 Reciprocity in children and chimpanzees
8.3 Summary
8.4 The gender gap
8.4.1 Attitudes to risk
8.4.2 Attitudes to competition
8.4.3 Social preferences
8.4.4 Why are men and women different?
8.5 The economics of family
8.6 Development economics
8.6.1 The education production function
8.6.2 Microfinance
8.7 Further reading
8.8 Review questions
9 Neuroeconomics
9.1 An introduction to the brain
9.1.1 An economist’s map of the brain
9.1.2 Brain processes
9.1.3 Executive control systems
9.1.4 Neurotransmitter and hormone
9.2 Valuing rewards and learning
9.2.1 Reward evaluation
9.2.2 Learning about rewards
9.2.3 Risk and uncertainty
9.2.4 Different types of reward
9.3 Making decisions
9.3.1 Choice and strategy
9.3.2 Framing effects
9.3.3 Strategic behavior
9.3.4 Fairness and norms
9.3.5 Punishment and inequality aversion
9.3.6 Present bias and a brain in conflict
9.3.7 Multiple-self models
9.4 Summary
9.5 Addiction
9.5.1 A model of rational addiction
9.5.2 Biases and addiction
9.5.3 Cues and addiction
9.5.4 Addiction and neuroscience
9.6 Further reading
9.7 Review questions
Part IV Welfare and policy
10 Happiness and utility
10.1 What makes us happy?
10.1.1 Happiness is relative
10.1.2 Adaption and habituation
10.2 Do we know what makes us happy?
10.2.1 Remembered utility
10.2.2 Projection bias
10.3 Choice and commitment
10.3.1 Does present bias matter?
10.3.2 Pre-commitment
10.3.3 Do people like having choice?
10.4 Summary
10.5 Health and happiness
10.5.1 Measuring the value of treatment
10.5.2 Improving the remembered utility of treatment
10.6 Mental health and life satisfaction
10.7 Saving and retirement
10.7.1 Projection bias in saving
10.7.2 Investor autonomy
10.8 Welfare trade-offs
10.8.1 The inflation–unemployment trade-off
10.8.2 Tax saliency
10.9 Further reading
10.10 Review questions
11 Policy and behavior
11.1 Designing good institutions
11.1.1 The tragedy of the commons
11.1.2 Matching markets
11.1.3 Spectrum auctions
11.1.4 Behavioral economics and institution design
11.2 Nudge and behavior change
11.2.1 Savings accounts
11.2.2 A default to save
11.2.3 Nudge
11.2.4 Nudge and behavior change
11.2.5 Consumer protection, health and the environment
11.3 Summary
11.4 Further reading
11.5 Review questions
Bibliography
Index