Analytic Philosophy

Höfundur: Aaron Preston (Útgáfa: 1)
Analytic Philosophy

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Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History explores the ways interpretation (of key figures, factions, texts, etc. ) shaped the analytic tradition, from Frege to Dummet. It offers readers 17 chapters, written especially for this volume by an international cast of leading scholars. Some chapters are devoted to large, thematic issues like the relationship between analytic philosophy and other philosophical traditions such as British Idealism and phenomenology, while other chapters are tied to more fine-grained topics or to individual philosophers, like Moore and Russell on philosophical method or the history of interpretations of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.

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Útgefandi
Taylor & Francis
ISBN
9781317556817
Print ISBN
9781138800786
Format
ePub
Útgáfa
1
Höfundar
Aaron Preston
Tungumál
English
Útgefið
2017-09-19
Prent takmörkun á líftíma
100
Prent takmörkun
2
Afritunar takmörkun
2
Flokkar
Heimspeki

Kaflar

  • Cover
  • Half Title
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Dedication
  • Table of Contents
  • 1. Editor’s Introduction: Interpreting the Analytic Tradition
  • Notes
  • References
  • 2. Idealism and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy: Moore Interprets Kant and Bradley
  • Idealism in Britain and in Germany
  • Moore Interprets Idealism
  • Notes
  • References
  • 3. The Changing Role of Language in Analytic Philosophy
  • Notes
  • References
  • 4. Russell, Ryle, and Phenomenology: An Alternative Parsing of the Ways
  • Husserl and Early Analytic Philosophy
  • Phenomenology and Ordinary Language Philosophy
  • Conclusion
  • Notes
  • References
  • 5. Some Main Problems of Moore Interpretation
  • Introduction
  • The Interpretation of Moore’s Philosophy: The Usual Suspects
  • Notes
  • References
  • 6. Russell’s Philosophical Method: How Analytic Philosophy is Shaped By and Perpetuates Its Misinterpretation
  • Introduction
  • 1a Analytic Realism (Logical Atomism): A Revolution
  • 1b The True Philosophic Method
  • 2a The Residue of Analysis: “It Seems an Unavoidable Inference”
  • 2b “Analysis Is the Method of Approximation to Reality”
  • 3a Knowledge in Philosophy
  • 3b A Speculative Interest in the Universe
  • Notes
  • References
  • 7. Analyzing Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
  • Laying the Groundwork
  • Interpreting the Tractatus
  • Mainstream Tractatus
  • The Tractatus and Analytic Philosophy
  • Notes
  • References
  • 8. The Later Wittgenstein
  • Notes
  • References
  • 9. Frank Ramsey and the Entanglement of Analytic Philosophy with Pragmatism
  • Introduction
  • The Logical Analytic Program
  • Ramsey and Russell
  • Ramsey and the Tractatus
  • Ramsey’s Pragmatist Account of Belief and Truth
  • Ramsey’s Influence on the Post-Tractarian Wittgenstein
  • Notes
  • References
  • 10. From Scientific to Analytic: Remarks on How Logical Positivism Became a Chapter of Analytic Philosophy
  • What Was Logical Positivism Before It Was Analytic?
  • “Analytic Philosophy” and Analytic Philosophy in America
  • First Contact: Logical Positivism as Read by British Analysts
  • Back to America: Interpretation and Historical Explanation
  • Notes
  • References
  • 11. Ernest Nagel’s Naturalism: A Microhistory of the American Reception of Logical Empiricism
  • I
  • II
  • III
  • IV
  • V
  • Notes
  • References
  • 12. “One of My Feet Was Still Pretty Firmly Encased in This Boot”: Behaviorism and The Concept of Mind
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • Conclusion
  • Notes
  • References
  • 13. Quine: The Last and Greatest Scientific Philosopher
  • I
  • II
  • III
  • Notes
  • References
  • 14. P. F. Strawson: Ordinary Language Philosophy and Descriptive Metaphysics
  • The Linguistic Turn and “Ordinary Language Philosophy”
  • P. F. Strawson: The Received View
  • A Shooting Star of Conceptual Analysis
  • The Rehabilitation of Metaphysics
  • Experience, Particulars and Universals
  • Scepticism: Transcendental Arguments and Naturalism
  • Notes
  • References
  • 15. Austin Athwart the Tradition
  • Introduction
  • Part One: A Beginner Among Beginners
  • Part Two: The Plain Person and the Philosopher
  • Finis
  • Notes
  • References
  • 16. Davidson’s Interpretation of Quine’s Radical Translation, and How It Helped Make Analytic Philosophy a Tradition
  • Quine’s Radical Translation
  • Davidson’s Radical Interpretation
  • Interpreting a Tradition
  • Notes
  • References
  • 17. Dummett’s Dialectics
  • Notes
  • References
  • 18. On the Traditionalist Conjecture
  • Philosophical Fruitfulness, Good Questions, and Satisfactory Answers
  • Reconstruction and Tradition
  • Narratives, Periodization, and Relevance
  • Traditionalist Narratives
  • The Problem with (iii)
  • The Problem with (i)
  • Illustration
  • Conclusion
  • Notes
  • References
  • Index