An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language

Höfundur: Michael Morris (Útgáfa: 1)
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language

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In this textbook, Michael Morris offers a critical introduction to the central issues of the philosophy of language. Each chapter focusses on one or two texts which have had a seminal influence on work in the subject, and uses these as a way of approaching both the central topics and the various traditions of dealing with them. Texts include classic writings by Frege, Russell, Kripke, Quine, Davidson, Austin, Grice and Wittgenstein.

Theoretical jargon is kept to a minimum and is fully explained whenever it is introduced. The range of topics covered includes sense and reference, definite descriptions, proper names, natural-kind terms, de re and de dicto necessity, propositional attitudes, truth-theoretical approaches to meaning, radical interpretation, indeterminacy of translation, speech acts, intentional theories of meaning, and scepticism about meaning.

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Útgefandi
Cambridge University Press
ISBN
9781107086128
Print ISBN
9780521842150
Format
ePub
Útgáfa
1
Höfundar
Michael Morris
Tungumál
English
Útgefið
2006-12-14
Prent takmörkun á líftíma
10
Prent takmörkun
5
Afritunar takmörkun
5
Flokkar
Heimspeki

Kaflar

  • Coverpage
  • An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language
  • Title page
  • Copyright page
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgements
  • Introduction
  • 1 Locke and the nature of language
  • 1.1 Introduction
  • 1.2 What Locke says
  • 1.3 Meaning and signification
  • 1.4 Problems about communication
  • 1.5 Words and sentences
  • 1.6 Locke’s less disputed assumptions
  • 2 Frege on Sense and reference
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 Psychologism and the Context Principle
  • 2.3 Frege and logic
  • 2.4 Frege’s mature system (i): reference
  • 2.5 Frege’s mature system (ii): Sense
  • 2.6 Two further uses of the notion of Sense
  • 2.7 Questions about Sense
  • 2.8 Sense and the Basic Worry
  • 3 Russell on definite descriptions
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 The problems
  • 3.3 Russell’s solution in outline
  • 3.4 Russell’s solution in detail
  • 3.5 Strawson on definite descriptions
  • 3.6 Donnellan on referential and attributive uses of descriptions
  • 3.7 Russellian defences
  • 3.8 Russell beyond descriptions
  • 4 Kripke on proper names
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 Kripke’s target
  • 4.3 Kripke’s objections (i): simple considerations
  • 4.4 Kripke’s objections (ii): epistemic and modal considerations
  • 4.5 Defences of the description theory
  • 4.6 Sense and direct reference
  • 4.7 Conclusion
  • 5 Natural-kind terms
  • 5.1 Introduction
  • 5.2 A Lockean view of natural-kind terms: the individualist version
  • 5.3 A Lockean view without individualism
  • 5.4 How can there be Kripke–Putnam natural-kind terms?
  • 5.5 How can natural-kind terms be rigid designators?
  • 6 Quine on de re and de dicto modality
  • 6.1 Introduction
  • 6.2 Quine’s three grades of modal involvement
  • 6.3 Referential opacity and Leibniz’s law
  • 6.4 Referential opacity and the three grades
  • 6.5 Quine’s logical problem with de re modality
  • 6.6 Quine’s metaphysical worries about de re modality
  • 7 Reference and propositional attitudes
  • 7.1 Introduction
  • 7.2 Quine’s problem
  • 7.3 Quine’s proposed solution
  • 7.4 Perry and the essential indexical
  • 7.5 The problems for Quine’s solution
  • 7.6 Consequences
  • 8 The semantics of propositional attitudes
  • 8.1 Introduction
  • 8.2 Kripke, names, necessity and propositional attitudes
  • 8.3 Kripke’s Pierre
  • 8.4 Referential solutions to the puzzle
  • 8.5 A Fregean response
  • 8.6 Davidson’s proposal
  • 8.7 Can Davidson’s proposal solve Kripke’s puzzle?
  • 9 Davidson on truth and meaning
  • 9.1 Introduction
  • 9.2 Meanings as entities
  • 9.3 Tarski’s ‘definition’ of truth
  • 9.4 Davidson’s use of Tarski
  • 9.5 The obvious objections to Davidson’s proposal
  • 9.6 Truth and the possibility of general semantics
  • 9.7 One final worry
  • 10 Quine and Davidson on translation and interpretation
  • 10.1 Introduction
  • 10.2 Quine and radical translation
  • 10.3 Davidson and radical interpretation
  • 10.4 Statements of meaning and propositional attitudes
  • 10.5 Theories of meaning and speakers’ knowledge
  • 10.6 How fundamental is radical interpretation?
  • 11 Quine on the indeterminacy of translation
  • 11.1 Introduction
  • 11.2 ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’
  • 11.3 Indeterminacy and inscrutability
  • 11.4 Resisting Quine on indeterminacy: some simple ways
  • 12 Austin on speech acts
  • 12.1 Introduction
  • 12.2 Performative utterances
  • 12.3 Towards a general theory of speech acts
  • 12.4 Truth and performatives
  • 12.5 Issues for a theory of speech acts
  • 13 Grice on meaning
  • 13.1 Introduction
  • 13.2 Grice’s overall strategy
  • 13.3 Sympathetic objections to Grice’s account of speaker-meaning
  • 13.4 Sympathetic objections to Grice’s account of expression-meaning
  • 13.5 An unsympathetic objection to Grice’s account of expression-meaning
  • 13.6 An unsympathetic objection to Grice’s account of speaker-meaning
  • 13.7 After Grice
  • 14 Kripke on the rule-following paradox
  • 14.1 Introduction
  • 14.2 The sceptical challenge
  • 14.3 The ‘sceptical solution’
  • 14.4 A community-based response
  • 14.5 Can dispositionalism be defended?
  • 14.6 Anti-reductionism and radical interpretation
  • 15 Wittgenstein on the Augustinian picture
  • 15.1 Introduction
  • 15.2 The Augustinian picture
  • 15.3 The Anti-Metaphysical interpretation
  • 15.4 The Quasi-Kantian interpretation
  • 15.5 Worries about these Wittgensteinian views
  • Glossary
  • Works cited
  • Index